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Article
Intermediary Design Duties
OLIVIER SYLVAIN
Online social networking applications and marketplaces enable users to
discover ideas, people, places, and products. The companies behind these services
purport to be little more than the conduits through which users socialize and
transact business. It is on this premise that, pursuant to the Communications
Decency Act (CDA), courts are reluctant to impose liability on intermediaries for
their users’ illegal online conduct. In spite of language in the statute that would
limit the safe harbor to intermediaries that voluntarily moderate users’ content
and behavior, courts today refrain from granting immunity only in cases in which
intermediaries “materially contribute” to illegal online conduct. This has proven
to be a very high juridical bar for plaintiffs to clear and a very generous
protection for defendant providers.
This doctrine rests on an outdated view of how most online intermediaries do
business. Today, the largest online companies do not merely host and relay
messages, uninterested in what their users say or do. They use behavioral and
content data to engineer online experiences in ways that are unrelated to the
charming interest in making connections. Some of the most successful companies,
moreover, collect, analyze, sort, and repackage user data for publication in
ancillary and secondary markets. This is how the CDA immunity doctrine, first
developed by the courts two decades ago, is ill-suited to the world today. Online
intermediaries are now aggressively exploiting user content in ways that the
doctrine does not fully acknowledge, leaving public law priorities and consumer
protections underenforced. Vulnerable people and historically subordinated
groups have the most to lose under this approach.
This Article proposes a reform that is adapted to online intermediaries’
outsized influence today. It proposes that courts scrutinize the manner in which
providers in each case elicit user content and the extent to which they exploit that
data in secondary or ancillary markets. Following this more searching approach,
courts will return the doctrine to its roots in the language and purpose of the
CDA: to shield intermediaries from liability for third-party online conduct only to
the extent they operate as either true conduits of user content.
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Intermediary Design Duties
OLIVIER SYLVAIN *
INTRODUCTION
Online social networking applications and marketplaces enable users
to discover ideas, people, places, and products that they would never find
otherwise. The companies behind these applications purport to do little
more than offer the “tools” for obtaining “information about what’s going
on in the world.”1 Policymakers, courts, and legal scholars generally agree
with this view.2 They tend to see video sharing applications like YouTube,
*
Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. I am grateful to the following colleagues
and friends for support and helpful comments during the drafting of this Article: Jim Brudney, Danielle
Citron, Nestor Davidson, Mary Ann Franks, Eric Goldman, Rachel Goodman, Abner Greene, Jameel
Jaffer, Olati Johnson, Joe Landau, Ron Lazebnik, Jae Lee, Ethan Leib, Robin Lenhardt, Frank
Pasquale, Mark Patterson, Kimani Paul-Emile, David Pozen, Joel Reidenberg, Ian Weinstein, and
Benjamin Zipursky. I am indebted to Michael Risch and all participants of the February 2017
Lastowka Cyberlaw Conference at Villanova School of Law for having the patience to review an early
draft of Part II. Participants in the Fordham Law School Center on Race, Law, and Justice Colloquium
series provided important insights that have improved the piece. Jocelyn Sagherian of the Fordham law
library provided invaluable research support. Meredith Cusick and Eric Hornbeck, my research
assistants, were reliable, industrious, and creative in their support of my work on this project.
1
Christina Passariello, Facebook: Media Company or Technology Platform?, WALL. ST. J. (Oct.
30, 2016, 10:22 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-media-company-or-technology-platform1477880520. See also Mathew Ingram, Facebook Denies It’s a Media Outlet, But Many Users
Disagree, FORTUNE (Feb. 9, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/02/09/facebook-study-news/ (reporting
that Facebook resists being labeled as a media company, though many users use Facebook as a news
outlet); Sam Schechner, Uber’s ‘Not a Taxi Company’ Defense on Trial in EU, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 29,
2016),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/ubers-not-a-taxi-company-defense-on-trial-in-eu-1480427094
(internal quotation marks omitted) (explaining Uber’s argument that it is not a “transportation
company” and is instead “an information society services provider that matches drivers with
passengers”).
2
See Huon v. Denton, 841 F.3d 733, 741 (7th Cir. 2016) (holding that “a company like Gawker
[Media] cannot be considered the publisher of information simply because the company hosts an online
forum for third-party users to submit comments.”); Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–
32 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that America Online, Inc. is a publisher of information, not a distributor
such as a “traditional news vendor[] or book seller[],” and is therefore, under 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1),
immune to causes of action “that would make service providers liable for information originating with
a third-party user of the service”). Scholars have noted that social networking sites, such as Facebook,
should be considered “publishers” of the content posted by third parties, in order to prevent a chilling
effect on internet free speech. See, e.g., Anthony Ciolli, Chilling Effects: The Communications
Decency Act and the Online Marketplace of Ideas, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 137, 148 (2008) (explaining
that 47 U.S.C. § 230, the Communications Decency Act, was passed to prevent a “chilling effect on
Internet speech” that would result from imposing liability on internet intermediaries for the statements
of third parties); Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries,
and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11, 28–29 (2006) (discussing Free Speech
implications in holding intermediaries responsible for the statements of third parties and noting that
“intermediaries have a peculiarly fragile commitment to the speech that they facilitate . . . . [I]n many
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social networking applications like Facebook, ride hailing mobile services
like Uber, and short-term homestay marketplaces like Airbnb as the
“conduits” through which end users communicate, socialize, and transact
business.3
One can be forgiven for holding this view. These applications
facilitate a variety of useful interactions. It is in this vein that courts today
generally conclude that ostensibly passive online intermediaries are
immune from liability for their users’ online conduct and content.4 Citing
the Communications Decency Act (CDA), courts hold that intermediaries
may only be liable if they “materially contribute” to the illegal online
conduct and content of their users.5
Courts reason that online
entrepreneurship and speech would be chilled if providers bore the costly
burden of policing their many users’ online conduct.6
This doctrine rests on an outdated view of how most service providers
do business. Today, most providers do not simply relay messages in the
charming interest of sharing ideas or making connections, uninterested in
what users say or do. The most popular applications today collect,
situations an intermediary . . . cannot capture the full value of speech, but can easily avoid potential
liability by simply declining to carry speech that could raise problems.”); Rebecca Tushnet, Power
Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986, 991,
998–99, 1006–07, 1009, 1015–16 (2008) (looking favorably upon the Communications Decency Act’s
efforts to limit an internet intermediary’s liability for the statements of its users, while also arguing that
the CDA should limit an intermediary’s ability to remove content and freely restrict the free speech of
its users); Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity, 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 293, 294, 300 (2011) (noting that websites such as message boards are simply “internet
intermediaries” and that imposing liability for harmful or offensive speech on them may cause them to
“block or eliminate too much content, including content that might be both lawful and socially
desirable”).
3
Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roomates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1167 (9th
Cir. 2008). See also Guy Pessach, Deconstructing Disintermediation: A Skeptical Copyright
Perspective, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 833, 842 (2013) (referring to “[s]earch engines” such as
Google and Yahoo, “content sharing platforms” such as Youtube, “social networks” such as Facebook,
and “online vendors” such as Airbnb, Uber, and Amazon as “content conduits and content retrieval
mechanisms”).
4
See Huon, 841 F.3d at 741–42 (holding that an internet intermediary is immune from liability
for defamation if it did not create or actively participate in posting the defamatory content); FTC v.
Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[T]o be ‘responsible’ for the development of
offensive content, one must be more than a neutral conduit for that content.”); Fair Hous. Council of
San Fernando Valley, 521 F.3d at 1162 (“Section 230 of the CDA immunizes providers of interactive
computer services against liability arising from content created by third parties . . . . This grant of
immunity applies only if the interactive computer service provider is not also an information content
provider . . . . A website operator can be both a service provider and a content provider: If it passively
displays content that is created entirely by third parties, then it is only a service provider with respect to
that content.” (internal footnotes and quotation marks omitted)). Congress, when drafting the CDA,
distinguished “interactive computer service[s],” which are immune from liability for the postings of
third parties, from “information content providers.” See 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(1), (f)(3) (1998) (defining
“information content providers” as persons or entities that are “responsible, in whole or in part, for the
creation and development of information”).
5
Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, 755 F.3d 398, 412, 415 (6th Cir. 2014).
6
Id.
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exhaustively analyze, sort, reconfigure, and repurpose customer
information for commercial gain.7 They rely on proprietary “black box”
technologies to recommend products, services, and connections
specifically targeted to each user.8 They employ techniques that keep users
yearning for more.9 Sometimes, their designs are so deeply affecting that
they transform the ways in which people talk about experiences in the
physical world.10
More than this, the companies behind the largest social media
applications profit from their extraordinary stores of users’ data.11 While
these companies arguably rely on aggregate user information to enhance
the online experience for everyone, they, at the same time, also exploit that
data in other information markets. Thus, today, online intermediaries do
not simply make new connections where none existed before. They
commercialize their users’ data.
Profits, of course, are not unlawful. They are sometimes a relatively
reliable measure of a company’s commercial success in the United States.
7
See, e.g., Julia Angwin & Jeremy Singer-Vine, Selling You on Facebook, WALL ST. J. (April 7,
2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303302504577327744009046230 (“A Wall
Street Journal examination of 100 of the most popular Facebook apps found that some seek the email
addresses, current location and sexual preference, among other details, not only of app users but also of
their Facebook friends. One Yahoo service powered by Facebook requests access to a person's
religious and political leanings as a condition for using it.”); Elizabeth Dwoskin & Craig Timberg,
Google Knows When Its Users Go to the Store and Buy Stuff, WASH. POST (May 23, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/05/23/google-now-knows-when-you-areat-a-cash-register-and-how-much-you-are-spending/?utm_term=.277ad9e87871 (noting that Google
“analyzes users’ Web browsing, search history, and Geographic locations” through “Youtube, Gmail,
Google Maps, and the Google Play store” and has recently started analyzing credit card records to
prove the success of its ad campaigns).
8
See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY 3, 20, 28–31, 34, 36, 66, 78–79 (2015)
(explaining how the term “black box” may mean a recording device, such as the data monitoring
system in an airplane, or a system whose actual workings are difficult to discern, and noting that black
box technologies have been used to determine health status, personality, eligibility for employment,
and consumer habits); see generally MIKO AJ JAN PISKORSKI, A SOCIAL STRATEGY: HOW WE PROFIT
FROM SOCIAL MEDIA (2014).
9
See TIM WU, ATTENTION MERCHANTS (2017); NIR EYAL, HOOKED (2013).
10
See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING: (AND WHY WE SHOULD
WORRY) 2, 6–7, 61 (2011) (stating that “Google is used as a noun and a verb” and observing that
Google influences ideologies and how its users interact with the world); Swipe Right (Or Left),
OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/swipe_right_(or_left) (last
visited July 29, 2017) (defining the terms “swipe right,” meaning attractive, and “swipe left,” meaning
unattractive,
which
originated
from
the
online
dating
app
Tinder).
See also Mark Molloy, Facebook Addiction ‘Activates Same Part of the Brain as Cocaine’,
TELEGRAPH (Feb 17, 2016, 2:15 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/12161461/Facebookaddiction-activates-same-part-of-the-brain-as-cocaine.html (explaining a scientific study that suggests
that Facebook use “affect[s] our grey matter in a similar way that cocaine does”).
11
See, e.g., Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and Power,
117 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming Aug. 2017) (manuscript at 4–5, 26), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2929643 (stating that companies like Google, Facebook, and Uber benefit
from monetizing the data collected from their users, making the user of their services the product, not
the consumer).
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But profits in this context also are the spoils of a legal regime that
effectively absolves online intermediaries from minding the harmful thirdparty user content that they host and repurpose for commercial gain. They
are the benefits of a legal protection that almost no other entity in other
legislative fields enjoys.12
Indeed, under current law, providers benefit from an immunity that
allows them to repurpose user data in ancillary or secondary markets based
on the happy but outdated fiction that such companies are only facilitating
user connections.
Many online intermediaries, after all, convey
agnosticism about the substance of their users’ online conduct. In doing
so, they dramatically understate the extent to which they pull the strings
from behind the scenes. But it is one thing to purport to administer an
ostensibly neutral application and another matter to exploit user data to
engineer how users communicate, socialize, and transact business in other
markets.
This is how the CDA immunity doctrine, born over two decades ago, is
at odds with the world as it is today. Internet intermediaries are structuring
online content, conduct, and the entire networked environment in ways that
the current doctrine does not contemplate.13 The consequences of this
failing are troubling and require reform.14
Consider two prominent online applications that connect people in the
housing market: Facebook and Airbnb. Facebook is most well-known for
its flagship social network application, through which it collects and
analyzes information about users’ friend networks, communities of
interest, and “likes” to personalize each user’s experience and connections.
This is the service for which most users sign up. But the company does so
much more with user data. First, it sells it to advertising networks and data
12
But see David Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones
Unlawful Disclosures Of Information, 127 HARV. L. REV. 512, 606 (2013) (discussing the
“source/distributor divide” in the context of government leaks).
13
Cf. Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online
Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018); Elizabeth Kolbert, Who Owns the Internet?, NEW
YORKER (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/08/28/who-owns-the-internet.
14
The most well-known reform proposal would remove the immunity for publishing content that
enables sex trafficking. See, e.g., Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act of 2017, S. 1693, 115th Cong.
(2017). Danielle Citron and Benjamin Wittes argue persuasively for reform in a law review article
published shortly before this one. See Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not
Break: Denying Bad Samaritans Section 230 Immunity, 86 FORD. L. REV. 401 (2017). Google has
underscored the powerful gatekeeping role in our networked information economy if news reports that
it is “manipulating its search engine results to favor opposition to” the legislation are to be believed.
See PR Newswire, Google Appears to Be Manipulating Its Search Engine Results to Defend Internet
Law that Enables Sex Trafficking, Consumer Watchdog Finds, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 11, 2017),
http://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/Google-Appears-to-Be-Manipulating-Its-SearchEngine-Results-to-Defend-Internet-Law-that-Enables-Sex-Trafficking-Consumer-Watchdog-Finds1002359550.
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brokers. Second, and more pertinently, it relies on the information it learns
about users to offer advertisers the powerful ability to market products and
services to potential “microtargeted” buyers.15 Until very recently, the
company allowed advertisers to target users based on their “ethnic
affinities” through this distinct but ancillary service.16 Thus, a hypothetical
building manager or broker could advertise an apartment for rent and
distribute the ad to people whose “ethnic affinities” fit a profile that he or
she prefers. With this designation, the service enables our manager or
broker to exclude people on that basis as well.
Facebook’s advertisement service is not limited by industry. An
advertiser can reach audiences across product types, from cosmetics to
sports clothing to kitchen appliances. Airbnb’s service, on the other hand,
enables members to advertise short-term rentals or apply to stay at those
listings. It urges members to share personal information, including their
names and personal profile pictures, which it, in turn, reserves the right to
sell to travel management partners and other third parties.17 The company
personalizes accounts to engender an authentic connection between hosts
and guests in ways that conventional online classified sites like Craigslist
do not. This ambition for fostering trusted and authentic connections
comes at a cost—when hosts look to accept someone they trust into their
homes, they look for familiar signs, including the potential guest’s race.
According to a Harvard Business School study, hosts systematically
discriminate against racial minorities based on the latter’s pictures and
names.18 As difficult as it is to detect when hosts are racist in their guest

15
See, e.g., Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Shooting Your Brand in the Foot: What Citizens United
Invites, 68 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1297, 1324–25 (2016) (“[I]nformation filter[s] place[] consumers in
isolated ‘tribes’. . . . [T]o the extent customers are living in their own tribal worlds, marketers will try
to reach the customer in their respective bubbles. This means mass marketers increasingly need to
micro-target sub-demographic groups.” (footnotes omitted)). Facebook also sells data to be used in
political campaigns. Allison Brennan, Microtargeting: How Campaigns Know You Better Than You
Know Yourself, CNN (Nov. 5, 2012, 6:45 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/11/05/politics/votersmicrotargeting/index.html (explaining how Facebook sells information to political campaigns so that
the campaigns may microtarget certain favorable demographics with political ads).
16
Julia Angwin & Terry Parris, Jr., Facebook Lets Advertisers Exclude Users by Race,
PROPUBLICA (Oct. 28, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-lets-advertisersexclude-users-by-race; Annalee Newitz, Facebook’s Ad Platform Now Guesses at Your Race Based on
Your Behavior, ARS TECHNICA (Mar. 18, 2016, 5:15 PM), https://arstechnica.com/informationtechnology/2016/03/facebooks-ad-platform-now-guesses-at-your-race-based-on-your-behavior/.
17
Privacy Policy, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/terms/privacy_policy (last visited July 31,
2017).
18
See Benjamin Edelman, Michael Luca, & Dan Svirsky, Racial Discrimination in the Sharing
Economy: Evidence from a Field Experiment, 9 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 1, 2 (2017) (“We find
widespread discrimination against guests with distinctively African American names. African
American guests received a positive response roughly 42 percent of the time, compared to roughly 50
percent for white guests.”).
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selection, anecdotal reports of Airbnb-facilitated discrimination surface
with enough frequency to suggest that the practice is not rare.19
There are good reasons to be concerned about these aspects of the
Facebook advertising service and Airbnb. Consider in particular the way
in which both services enable advertisers to target their ads based on
information that is barred by anti-discrimination laws. The 1968 Fair
Housing Act (FHA) specifically forbids home sellers or renters, as well as
brokers, property managers, and agents, from distributing advertisements
“that indicate[] any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race,
color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin . . . .”20
Both companies have defensible arguments that they may not be held
liable for the discriminatory online behavior of their users under the
prevailing immunity doctrine. Under this theory, they simply provide the
tools on which users, landlords, and building managers rely as they please.
In the language of the current doctrine, neither Facebook nor Airbnb are
materially contributing to the objectionable content.
Yet, these companies know that they may be doing something wrong,
if not illegal. Both companies have taken steps to diminish the racially
discriminatory impact of their respective applications in recognition of the
role that their applications may play. Airbnb commissioned a prominent
civil rights attorney to study hosts’ use of the application.21 This report
was not an empirical study of Airbnb host racism as such. But its findings
acknowledged patterns of discrimination and recommended remedial steps,
all of which the company adopted.22 Airbnb also announced that it would
redouble its commitment to nondiscrimination.23 While it has not
discontinued the use of photographs, the main concern of civil rights
groups, it now has a strict policy of removing members who use the
application in ways that violate civil rights laws.24
Facebook, for its part, reformed its audience selection policy in the
advertising service, replacing the “ethnic affinity” classifications with what
19

See, e.g., Kristen Clarke, Does Airbnb Enable Racism?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/23/opinion/how-airbnb-can-fight-racial-discrimination.html
(describing the African American author’s unusual difficulty in booking an Airbnb reservation); Carla
Javier, A Trump-Loving Airbnb Host Canceled This Woman’s Reservation Because She’s Asian,
SPLINTER NEWS (Apr. 6, 2017, 4:11 PM), http://splinternews.com/a-trump-loving-airbnb-hostcanceled-this-womans-reserva-1794086239 (reporting that an Asian woman’s Airbnb reservation was
cancelled abruptly and displaying screenshots of text messages where the host said: “I wouldn’t rent to
u [sic] if u [sic] were the last person on earth. One word says it all. Asian.”).
20
42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2007).
21
LAURA MURPHY, LAURA MURPHY & ASSOCS., AIRBNB’S WORK TO FIGHT DISCRIMINATION
AND BUILD INCLUSION: A REPORT SUBMITTED TO AIRBNB 10 (2016), http://blog.airbnb.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/09/REPORT_Airbnbs-Work-to-Fight-Discrimination-and-Build-Inclusion.pdf.
22
Id. at 10–12.
23
Id. at 12.
24
Id. at 10–11.
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25

it now calls “multicultural affinity.” The company also now prohibits
users from targeting or excluding specific groups of people from seeing
ads for housing, credit, or employment.26 It requires advertisers to certify
that their practices comply with its nondiscrimination policies and
antidiscrimination laws.27
These are important steps. But, one year later, Facebook reportedly
continues to enable advertisers to discriminate against protected classes.28
In any event, Facebook’s (ostensibly failing) efforts to reform are not
enough to stop discrimination in other online markets for housing. What
of all other applications and marketplaces that purport to be content
agnostic about online conduct, but whose designs enable users to do bad
things they might not otherwise be able to do? Under the current doctrine,
liability may not reach intermediaries that routinely host illegal content by
design. And, in any event, bigoted advertisers will continue to use
Facebook’s service notwithstanding the proviso from Facebook that such
uses are not permitted. Other services, moreover, may choose not to
respond in the same way that Facebook has.
The immunity under the CDA, codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230, gives such
intermediaries cover largely because courts have read the protection
broadly. And they have had good reason to. The first operative provision
of the statute states that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.”29 Congress’s reference
here to “publisher or speaker” draws from defamation law doctrine, where
a defendant publisher is as liable for republishing reputation-damaging
25
Improving Enforcement and Promoting Diversity: Updates to Ads Policies and Tools,
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Feb. 8, 2017), http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/02/improvingenforcement-and-promoting-diversity-updates-to-ads-policies-and-tools/.
See
also
Sapna
Maheshwari & Mike Isaac, Facebook Will Stop Some Ads From Targeting Users by Race, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/12/business/media/facebook-will-stop-some-adsfrom-targeting-users-by-race.html?_r=0 (“Facebook responded on Friday to concern that it was
violating anti-discrimination laws, announcing that marketers placing housing, employment or credit
ads on the social network would no longer be able to use tools that target people by ethnicity.”).
26
See Improving Enforcement and Promoting Diversity: Updates to Ads Policies and Tools,
supra note 25 (“[A]dvertisers may not discriminate against people based on personal attributes such as
race, ethnicity, color, national origin . . . . When an advertiser attempts to show an ad that we identify
as offering a housing, employment or credit opportunity and either includes or excludes our
multicultural advertising segments—which consist of people interested in seeing content related to the
African American, Asian American and US Hispanic communities—we will disapprove the ad.”).
27
See id. (“When an advertiser attempts to show an ad that we identify as offering a housing,
employment or credit opportunity and uses any other audience segment on Facebook . . . . [w]e will . . .
require the advertiser to certify that it is complying with that policy and with applicable antidiscrimination laws.”).
28
See Julia Angwin, Ariana Tobin, and Madeleine Varner, Facebook (Still) Letting Housing
Advertisers Exclude Users by Race, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/
article/facebook-advertising-discrimination-housing-race-sex-nationalorigin?utm_campaign=sprout&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter&utm_content=1511288776.
29
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
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material as its author.30 When enacted in 1996, Section 230(c) was
intended to bar courts from holding providers liable for publishing
information that could harm users’ reputation.
This was and remains an idiosyncratic and exceptional treatment under
law. Newspapers and book imprints, for example, remain as liable for
publishing unlawful classified advertisements or opinion editorials as the
original authors are.31 Legislators in 1996 expressed the view that
providers of online services and applications were different—that they
should not be held to account for the massive amounts of third-party user
content that they host and publish.32 Parroting the emergent ethos among
technologists and internet free-speech activists, legislators in this period
found that imposing liability on online intermediaries for failing to screen
or remove all offending content would exact a “chilling” toll on all users
that is far greater than it would be for traditional publishers.33 In such a
world, providers would censor any content that they rightly or wrongly
believe exposes them to liability.34 Section 230 relieves intermediaries of
that heavy burden in the interest of promoting entrepreneurship and
freedom of expression online.
Most legislators in 1996, however, could not have anticipated that the
internet would permeate public life or that intermediaries would engineer
practically all our online conduct. They did appreciate, however, that the
protection could not be absolute. Section 230 specifically provides that the
immunity recedes when the provider in question “is responsible, in whole
or in part, for the creation or development” of the offending information.35

30

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (AM. LAW. INST. 1977) (“Except as to those who
only deliver or transmit defamation published by a third person, one who repeats or otherwise
republishes defamatory matter is subject to liability as if he had originally published it.”).
31
See id. at cmt. b (“It is no defense that the second publisher names the author or original
publisher of the libel. Thus a newspaper is subject to liability if it republishes a defamatory statement .
. . .”).
32
See, e.g., 104 CONG. REC. 8471 (1995) (statement of Rep. Goodlatte) (“There is no way that
any of those entities . . . can take the responsibility to edit out information that is going to be coming in
to them from all manner of sources . . . . We are talking about something that is going to be thousands
of pages of information every day, and to have that imposition imposed on them is wrong.”).
33
See id. (statement of Rep. Cox) (“If we regulate the Internet at the FCC, that will freeze or at
least slow down technology. It will threaten the future of the Internet.”); id. (statement of Rep.
Lofgren) (“Really it is like saying that the mailman is going to be liable when he delivers a plain brown
envelope for what is inside it. It will not work. It is a misunderstanding of the technology . . . . I
would urge [47 U.S.C. § 230’s] approval so that we preserve the first amendment and open systems on
the Net.”).
34
See Wu, supra note 2, at 300 (noting that internet intermediaries, if exposed to liability, may
delete a substantial amount of content, even content that is “lawful and socially desirable”).
35
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (1998).
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Congress also wrote in a “Good Samaritan” safe harbor to incentivize
providers to mind their users’ “objectionable” content.36
The courts have nevertheless adopted a very broad reading of the
statute that belies these limits on immunity. The courts reason that,
without this generous protection, the threat of litigation would chill
providers’ willingness to host and publish all but the most anodyne
content.37 So, even while a meaningful but small threat of litigation always
remains, service providers today rest easy in knowing that they are not
legally implicated by any of their users’ harmful communications.
Today, the Good Samaritan, who is supposed to tend to the most
vulnerable,38 plays no role in the courts’ administration of Section 230. In
a glaring irony, the prevailing doctrine turns the biblical parable for which
Congress named the operative provisions on its head.
To be fair, some of the objectives to which legislators aspired have
come to pass. Users today have an abundance of ways to transact business
and socialize online largely because entrepreneurs have felt safe to
experiment and innovate, unconcerned by the potential for third-party
wrongdoing. Yet, there is good reason to doubt that entrepreneurs needed
the immunity to enter the market. Even in the mid-1990s, people
understood that the internet’s transmission protocols, interoperable
network design, and end-user focus would transform markets and birth
lucrative new ones. The internet was always promising, with or without
the protection of Section 230. But the prevailing online immunity doctrine
has removed much of the risk for entrepreneurs. This is largely why,
today, applications and websites of all kinds, from the frivolous to the truly
disruptive, seem to spring up nearly daily.
The current doctrine gives the online entrepreneurs behind these
services no incentive to be Good Samaritans—or to even consider the
social costs of their services. In this way, the courts have developed a
broad immunity that could very well protect Facebook and Airbnb from
liability for systematic third-party violations of the FHA. The doctrine,
after all, is premised largely on the view that service providers should not
have to police the massive amount of third-party content that flows through
their servers. Bigoted advertisers in this conception are to blame, not the
36

Id. § 230(c)(2)(A) (“No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable
on account of . . . any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of
material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.”)
37
See, e.g., Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Faced with potential
liability for each message republished by their services, interactive computer service providers might
choose to severely restrict the number and type of messages posted.”)
38
See Luke 10:25–37 (“[A] Samaritan, as he traveled, came where the man was; and when he saw
him, he took pity on him. He went to him and bandaged his wounds, pouring on oil and wine. Then he
put the man on his own donkey, brought him to an inn and took care of him.”).
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engineers of the “neutral” tools that facilitate connections. It is for this
reason that neither Facebook nor Airbnb might be required to police the
illegally discriminatory expressive acts of the millions of users of its
services. Facebook does not discriminate in the housing market; its users
and advertisers do. Airbnb does not require users to signify racial
preferences; hosts do.
This Article proposes a reform that is adapted to the influence that
developers of applications and marketplaces like Facebook and Airbnb
have today. But I do not invent this recommendation out of whole cloth.
While Section 230 doctrine to this point suggests that those specific
companies would be immune for users’ unlawful online conduct,
developments of the past few years suggest that providers like Facebook
and Airbnb should be wary. Courts have begun to pull away from their
broad reading of Section 230 and attend more carefully to the ways in
which online intermediaries design users’ online content and transactions.
While courts have instituted the high bar of “material contribution” to
evaluate whether a provider had a hand in developing illegal content, they
also have identified designs and conditions that define the substance of the
information that users share.39
Based on these developments, I propose here that courts shield
providers from liability for third-party online conduct only to the extent
they either are true passive conduits or actually take good-faith steps to
remove or block illegal content. In some regards, this is a reframing of the
Good Samaritan safe harbor that Congress already articulated in the
statute. But, importantly, it pivots away from conditioning immunity only
on “restrict[ing] access” to “objectionable” content.40 The proposal here
instead would bar immunity when providers process and publish user data
in ancillary or secondary markets in ways such that their users do not
knowingly or directly benefit. In practice, this approach would likely
continue to shield intermediaries that do nothing more than provide the
adverted networking and marketplace service, but would likely not shield
those like Facebook or Airbnb that sell user data to advertisers to varying
extents.

39
See FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1198–99 (10th Cir. 2009) (holding that
“develop[ment],” in the context of the CDA, means to “draw[] something out, making it visible, active,
or usable,” and that intermediaries are “responsible” for the development of offensive content if they
“specifically encourage[] development of what is offensive about the content” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157,
1165, 1167 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that “[t]he CDA does not grant immunity for inducing third parties
to express illegal preferences” and holding that Roommate.com, an internet intermediary, developed
offensive content by directing its users to sort potential housing mates by personal characteristics such
as race, gender, and sexuality).
40
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (1998).
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While I claim novelty here, I do so mindful of the massive number of
law review pages devoted to the topic of online intermediary immunity.
To the extent this Article offers anything new, it is in its argument that
online intermediary designs implicate online services and applications far
more than courts have recognized to this point.41 In this regard, it adds
another dimension to the argument that Congress ought to narrow the
scope of protection under the statute for publication of harmful material
like nonconsensual porn.42 This Article also identifies the ways in which
content agnosticism has the effect of harming historically subordinated
groups in historically fraught legal markets like housing, employment, and
credit. Communications law in the United States encourages inclusion as a
matter of course.43 The safe harbor under Section 230, I argue, should
similarly be read to apply to firms that take affirmative steps in good faith
to protect against unlawful—that is, systematically discriminatory—online
behavior.
This Article makes its argument in four parts. Part I describes the
current ways in which intermediaries collect and generally interact with
information from users. The range of prominent design features, from
anonymity to ephemeral messaging, suggests that providers have far more
agency in choosing how to structure their services and applications. They
are generally motivated, moreover, by commercial incentives that often
counsel for structuring applications and services that are far more
determinative of user content than the prevailing doctrine presumes.
Part II describes the evolution of the current doctrine, from the
high-minded and broad protection of intermediaries in the late 1990s to its
current refinements and elaborations. In this evolution, I show that service
and application designs have come into sharper focus for courts. Part III
builds on this account to demonstrate the ways in which the current
doctrine has created an opening for considering the ways in which
intermediary designs determine user content and online conduct.
Finally, in Part IV, the Article returns to the example of Facebook’s
41
There are important overlaps, moreover, with the contemporaneously published piece by
Danielle Citron and Benjamin Wittes on the limitations of current doctrine and the need for reform
addressed to gender-based abuse and sex trafficking. See Citron & Wittes, supra note 14.
42
See Stop Enabling Sex-Traffickers Act of 2017, S. 1693, 115th Cong. (2017); Danielle Keats
Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans Section 230
Immunity, 86 FORD. L. REV. 401 (2017).
43
See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1996) (stating that the Federal Communications Commission was created
“[f]or the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio
so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States, without discrimination
on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide, and worldwide wire and radio communication service”); Olivier Sylvain, Network Equality, 67 HASTINGS L.J.
443, 449 (2016) (“The FCC has declared that the Internet is a public general use technology—like
electricity—and, accordingly, must be treated under law as a common carrier. Under this rule, service
providers must ensure that all members of the public who try to access the Internet are treated
equally.”).
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advertising service to argue that, indeed, there are compelling reasons for
reading Section 230 far more carefully in today’s online environment.
I.

ANTISOCIAL MEDIA

Policymakers, technologists, and activists have had great hopes for the
internet. The excitement about its promise was no more feverish than in
the first decade or so after Congress fully commercialized it in 1995. The
general view then was that the internet’s transmission protocols, distributed
and interoperable network design, and end-user focus would cause deep
structural transformations everywhere and in all aspects of life. 44
Nongovernmental consensus-driven administration and standards would
govern.45
It is this ethos that gave rise to 47 U.S.C. § 230—one of the most
important legislative enactments addressed to internet services and
applications.46
Among other things, Section 230 (entitled the
Communications Decency Act) shields providers of “interactive computer
service[s]” from liability for content that their third-party users circulate
through the online service.47 As written, this protection, however, does not
reach applications that are in any part “responsible . . . for the creation or
development” of “objectionable” material.48 But there is more to the
statute than a simple reform of defamation law. Through it, Congress
explicitly shields service providers from liability for exercising “Good
Samaritan” editorial judgment about substantive content. That is, the
immunity applies to services that edit, filter, or take down objectionable
material, or help users to do so.49
Courts read Section 230 extremely broadly in spite of how it is written.
They hold that the provision immunizes networked services and online
44
David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law And Borders: The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48
STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence;
Esther Dyson et al., Cyberspace And The American Dream: A Magna Carta For The Knowledge Age,
FUTURE INSIGHT (Aug. 1994), http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/futureinsights/fi1.2magnacarta.html.
45
Johnson & Post, supra note 44, at 1367; Barlow, supra note 44; Dyson et al., supra note 44.
46
The Communications Decency Act is Title V of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, § 230, 110 Stat. 56, 137–39 (1996)
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1998)).
47
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (1998). The statute explicitly preempts state tort law. Section 230(e)(3)
provides, among other things, that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be
imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” Id. § 230(e)(3).
48
Id. §§ 230(c)(2)(A), (f)(3).
49
Id. Section 230(c)(2) shields interactive computer services that have voluntarily taken steps in
good faith to censor or take down “material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such
material is constitutionally protected . . . .” Id. I return to the particulars of the statute—its text,
history, and purposes—infra Part II.
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applications from liability for publishing the illegal content of their users.50
So, under current law, a social media company cannot be held responsible
for allowing a user to post compromising private photographs of his exgirlfriend publicly.51 A search engine cannot be called to task under law
for displaying the advertisements of third parties that sell copyrighted
ringtones.52 An online advertising service is under no legal obligation to
remove posts that encourage the sex trafficking of minors.53
Two decades later, there is reason to believe that Section 230 and the
information libertarianism on which it is based have been a great success.54
The internet’s remarkably rapid integration into public life over the past
two decades has arguably shown that application developers, free from the
threat of government regulation or tort liability, can be good stewards of
life and commerce online. Popular applications like YouTube, the
video-sharing site, and Reddit, the news aggregation and discussion site,
have developed conventions and software for the moderation of user
content, even as users create, contribute, and interact prodigiously.55 These
services are the conduits envisioned by the early proponents of broad
50

See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.
See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F. 3d 1096, 1098, 1102–04 (9th Cir. 2009), amended by Barnes
v. Yahoo, Inc., 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 21308 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that Yahoo! was not responsible
for one of its users posting an ex-girlfriend’s nude photographs on his profile).
52
See Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1195, 1197–98, 1202 (N.D. Cal. 2009)
(holding that Google was not responsible for fraudulent advertisements that were posted on Google’s
websites).
53
Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 16, 18–22 (1st Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct.
622 (2017).
54
See generally Jane R. Bambauer & Derek E. Bambauer, Information Libertarianism, 105 CAL.
L. REV. 335 (2017).
55
YouTube removes or age restricts “nudity or sexual content,” “harmful or dangerous content,”
copyrighted content, “hateful content” which “promotes or condones violence against individuals or
groups,” “threats,” and “spam, misleading metadata, and scams.” Community Guidelines, YOUTUBE,
https://www.youtube.com/yt/policyandsafety/communityguidelines.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2017);
Nudity and Sexual Content, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2802002 (last
visited Aug. 5, 2017). YouTube removes inappropriate content through a “flagging” system, where
YouTube users “flag” videos or comments and a member of YouTube staff reviews the video or
comment and removes it if it violates the community guidelines. Id. YouTube also uses a system
called “Content ID,” which compares user uploads to copyrighted content and automatically blocks,
monetizes, or tracks the content if it finds a match. How Content ID Works, YOUTUBE,
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en (last visited Aug. 5, 2017). Reddit relies
heavily on volunteer moderators, who are capable of removing content, banning users from their
“subreddits,” and creating “AutoModerator,” which are “bot” that remove certain kinds of content
automatically. Moderation, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/wiki/moderation (last visited Aug. 5,
2017). Reddit, which emphatically champions free speech, was criticized in 2015 for permanently
banning five “questionable” subreddits. See, e.g., Caitlin Dewey, These Are the Five Subreddits Reddit
Banned Under Its Game-Changing Anti-Harassment Policy—And Why it Banned Them, WASH. POST
(June 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-intersect/wp/2015/06/10/these-are-the-5subreddits-reddit-banned-under-its-game-changing-anti-harassment-policy-and-why-it-bannedthem/?utm_term=.92bf470cd3b4 (discussing Reddit’s actions in banning subreddits “dedicated to fatshaming,” “transphobia,” “ racism,” and “to harassing members of a progressive video game site”).
51
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immunity for providers, helping to transform the internet into the “forum
for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.”56 And they
have done so with a “minimum of government regulation.”57
But, today, online intermediaries are more than open forums for
user-generated discourse, cultural development, and intellectual activity.
Those priorities have given way to or, rather, have been complicated by
pecuniary ones.
In the mid-2000s, prominent observers of the
networked-information economy debated whether for-profit motivations
would predominate online.58 There is little question, however, that most
application developers today have either succumbed to the commercial
prerogatives of the large corporations that have bought them or, having
become large companies themselves, have leveraged their market position
to develop ancillary or secondary lines of business.
Today, online services do so much more than relay or store
user-generated content in the way that the early proponents of immunity
and nongovernmental interference presumed. They actively shape every
aspect of the user experience.59 Many of the most successful internet
companies, moreover, design their applications to collect, analyze, sort,
reconfigure, and repurpose user data for their own commercial reasons,
unrelated to the original interest in publishing material or connecting
users.60
These developments belie any suggestion that online
intermediaries are merely conduits of user information anymore. Today, to
the extent a company purports to be agnostic about its users’ content, it
generally does so mindful that its design will invite a wide range of
content, including illegal or otherwise antisocial material.
Content moderation like that employed by YouTube or Reddit,
therefore, is only a piece of how intermediaries manage user content. And
this is an important point, as it suggests that the original logic for immunity
is incomplete or simply wrong. Indeed, providers today are far more
implicated in the kinds of content that users create or commercial
transactions into which users enter. So, in order for the immunity doctrine
to be addressed to our current state of affairs, the courts will have to revise
56

47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3).
Id. § 230(a)(4).
58
See, e.g., Mathew Ingram, The Carr-Benkler Wager and the Peer-Powered Economy, GIGAOM
(May 9, 2012, 3:02 PM), https://gigaom.com/2012/05/09/the-carr-benkler-wager-and-the-peerpowered-economy/ (discussing a 2006 bet between author Nick Carr and Harvard professor Yochai
Benkler, where Benkler wagered that the internet is primarily based on “commons-based peer
production” and Carr wagered that content sharing networks were only successful because a market
had not yet developed for online goods).
59
Cf. Klonick, supra note 13; Kolbert, supra note 13.
60
See supra notes 7, 8, 15 and accompanying text. This is to say nothing of the myriad of ways
in which companies use algorithmic processing and machine learning to predict user online behavior.
57
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their current approach. As I recommend later, the doctrine would have to
require courts to consider whether intermediaries’ designs create the
conditions under which their users unavoidably engage in illegal activity.
Before turning to reform, however, this Part describes our current state
of affairs. First, I outline the ways in which applications that rely on
user-generated content manage their users’ interactions, even while they
purport to be mere passive hosts. To do this, I review the way in which
some of the most recognizable online intermediaries today have chosen to
moderate user content and interactions. And while moderation has
emerged as an important way of managing user interactions, I then show
that popular intermediaries today, namely, Airbnb and Facebook, are
constantly managing the design of their applications in order to structure
the manner in which user content gets shared and manipulated by others.
The lesson in all of this is that, today, as application designs become ever
more determinative of online conduct, we might expect that the scope of
immunity would recede.
A. Moderating User Content
Through Section 230, Congress sought to encourage online
intermediaries to be passive conduits that facilitate end users’
communications and transactions. Providers in this conception contribute
nothing original or material to their users’ content. They only undertake a
limited set of operations to support user creativity and user-to-user
interaction, agnostic about the substance of the thing. Under the current
doctrine, this relative unconcern with content qualifies a provider for
immunity. Congress sought to protect these kinds of services and
applications in order to encourage content diversity and the free flow of
information on the internet.61 Courts, in interpreting Section 230,
presumed that, without the protection, providers would be chilled into
censoring unpopular or unsavory online user conduct far more than
necessary to avoid even the possibility of liability.62
Today, several popular web-based applications continue to embody
this laissez-faire conception, operating as simple “platforms” for the
distribution of user-generated content.63 YouTube, the video-sharing
61
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3) (2012) (“The Internet and other interactive computer services offer a
forum for a true diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and
myriad avenues for intellectual activity.”).
62
See Wu, supra note 2, at 300, 315–18 (stating that Congress’s intent in passing Section 230 was
vague, but that courts interpreted the statute to mean that internet intermediaries should not be subject
to liability, as it would have a “chilling effect” on freedom speech on the internet).
63
The platform metaphor itself is very evocative and, as such, often used by scholars in
information and communications law. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L.
REV. 87, 94 (2016) (stating that “a platform company is launched as an online intermediary between
buyers and sellers of goods and services—the ancient role of the middle man”); Richard S. Whitt,
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application, is probably the most recognizable of these. On the one hand, it
has become invaluable to the promotion and distribution of videos by
professionals and major production studios. But, as the company’s name
and slogan “Broadcast Yourself” suggest, YouTube markets itself above
all as a democratic forum through which any and all users may express
themselves.64 Its administrators only manage registration, suspension, or
deletion of user accounts, the means by which users upload videos, and
features through which other users may rank or comment on the post.65
While the company enters into distribution and syndication arrangements
with content developers, at the core of the YouTube business, as with most
applications that rely on user-generated content, is a faith in the creativity
and agency of users as creators and discriminating consumers.
This is to say nothing of the way in which the service has helped to
disintermediate hub-and-spoke video distribution models in, for example,
broadcasting and cable television. By creating a platform for individual
users to post videos, YouTube has helped to foster a whole new logic and
political economy for content distribution. In this way, it is the
quintessential exemplar of what Congress and scholars must have had in
mind twenty years ago.
But questions remain about the extent to which YouTube or other
user-generated video sharing applications must actively monitor and, in
some ways, shape content on their sites.66 The company has been the
defendant in secondary liability claims in a variety of cases, including a
widely publicized billion-dollar lawsuit for hosting high-value copyrighted
material posted by third-party users without authorization.67 It is clear
Evolving Broadband Policy: Taking Adaptive Stances to Foster Optimal Internet Platforms, 17
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 417, 439 (2009) (using platform as a “helpful metaphor” to argue that the
purpose of broadband is “to serve as a platform for allowing end users to utilize the capabilities of the
Internet”). The metaphor, however, has its limitations, as it assumes too much. Frank Pasquale offers
a more nuanced and productive point of view. See generally Frank Pasquale, Two Narratives of
Platform Capitalism, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 309 (2016).
64
See, e.g., Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 28 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Under the
slogan ‘Broadcast yourself,’ Youtube achieved rapid prominence and profitability . . . .”).
65
See, e.g., id. (stating that YouTube requires users to register for an account and requires users to
agree to its terms of service, but does not create, strictly moderate, or review all content uploaded to the
site).
66
For example, if the intermediaries have “actual knowledge” of hosting copyrighted material,
they may be open to liability if they do not take sufficient steps to remove the illegal content. UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1024–25 (9th Cir. 2013). See Viacom
Int’l, Inc., 676 F.3d at 33–34 (discussing email conversations wherein the YouTube founders, Jared
Karim and Chad Hurley, debated the costs and benefits of removing specific copyrighted materials
from the site, which exposed YouTube to liability for hosting the illegal content).
67
See Viacom Int’l, Inc., 676 F.3d at 28–29 (summarizing a class action suit brought against
YouTube, where a group of several copyright holders brought suit against YouTube for knowingly
hosting 63,497 videos containing copyrighted material). Viacom originally sued YouTube for $1
billion; the case was settled and the terms of the settlement were not disclosed. See Jonathan Stempel,
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from these cases that YouTube and other video sharing sites like it can and
indeed do moderate which user-generated content appears on the service,
even if it does not create or edit the content once up. Indeed, YouTube in
particular administers a “Partner Program” through which users can
syndicate video programming through the service,68 as well as Content ID,
which empowers copyright holders to track unauthorized posts by users of
their content.69
Yet, irrespective of the extent to which YouTube monitors or engages
users’ content, the service remains mostly a disinterested repository for
uninhibited user expression, hosting an astounding number of videos
addressed to almost all humanly-known topics. In this way, YouTube
resembles a conduit through which all user content may reach every user of
the application. But, again, it is not a purely passive conduit, as it
structures the ways in which users post and monitor content.
As with most providers like it, YouTube recognized the perils of
designing its service in this way early on. It, again, like most
user-generated content platforms, requires its users to abide by
“Community Guidelines.” Failure to adhere will lead to account
suspension or termination.70
Even Reddit, an online website that has been evangelical about its
non-interventionist approach to user-generated content since its founding
in 2005, has reformed its approach over the last couple of years. Like
YouTube, Reddit allows registered users to comment on and vote up or
down stories and posts from any source.71 The community of users assigns
each story to a predetermined category—say, in movies, gaming, and
“futurology.”72 But Reddit allows registered users to initiate discussion
Google, Viacom Settle Landmark YouTube Lawsuit, THOMSON REUTERS (Mar. 18, 2014, 9:05 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-google-viacom-lawsuit-idUSBREA2H11220140318. In 2015, an
actress brought a suit against YouTube for hosting an edited, controversial video of herself, for which
she received death threats. Garcia v. Google, 786 F.3d 733, 736–38 (9th Cir. 2015). The actress
alleged that she owned the copyright for her own image, but her claim ultimately failed on that ground.
Id. at 740–41, 744, 747.
68
YouTube Partner Program Overview, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube
/answer/72851?hl=en (last visited Oct. 27, 2017).
69
How Content ID Works, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370?hl=en
(last visited Nov. 4, 2017)
70
Community Guidelines, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/yt/policyandsafety/enGB/communityguidelines.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2017) (“Accounts are penalised [sic] for
Community Guidelines violations, and serious or repeated violations can lead to account termination.”).
71
See, e.g., Andrew Couts, How to Get a Link on the Front Page of Reddit, DIGITAL TRENDS
(Apr. 12, 2013, 12:02 PM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/how-to/how-to-get-a-link-on-the-front-pageof-reddit/ (“Once a link is submitted, other users can either “upvote” or “downvote” the link. They can
also comment on the link.”).
72
Futurology, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/Futurology/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2017); Gaming,
REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/gaming/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2017); Movies, REDDIT,
https://www.reddit.com/r/movies/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2017).
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threads called “subreddits.”73 The popularity of any post determines its
location on the site, with the most popular being the most visible on the
first entry page.74 This bottom-up, democratic design has made Reddit a
celebrated site among online speech enthusiasts.
Reddit, however, also has fallen victim to its own design as it finds
itself hosting provocative posts and subreddits, including those that
promote terrorist or misogynist violence.75 In response to substantial
pushback from users over the past couple of years, the company has
revised its extremely laissez-faire position. In early 2017, for example, it
adopted a “Content Policy” that, on the one hand, promotes the site as the
“home to some of the most authentic content anywhere online,” but,
importantly, also recognizes the value of “show[ing] enough respect to
others so that we all may continue to enjoy Reddit for what it is.”76
Among other things, the policy explicitly prohibits “illegal” content,
“involuntary pornography,” material that “[e]ncourages or incites
violence,” and content that “[t]hreatens, harasses, or bullies or encourages
others to do so.”77
This reform has been met with palpable resistance from some very
vocal users. In response to efforts by the company to ban misogynist
threads under this new policy,78 for example, “redditors” and online
73

See What Are Communities or “Subreddits”?, REDDITHELP, https://reddit.zendesk.com/hc/enus/articles/204533569-What-are-communities-or-subreddits (last visited Aug. 5, 2017) (defining
“subreddits” as “sub-communities within reddit . . . created and moderated by users . . . dedicated each
to certain topics or ideas”).
74
See, e.g., Couts, supra note 71 (“Once a link is submitted, other users can either ‘upvote’ or
‘downvote’ the link . . . . Submitted posts rise or fall based on the number of upvotes, which add to the
overall ‘karma’ score of the post, versus the number of downvotes, which are subtracted from the
overall score. . . . The posts with the greatest number of upvotes in a each subreddit can rise to the
coveted front page.”).
75
See Rob Crilly, Reddit Takes Down Forum Used To Share Stolen Celebrity Photographs,
TELEGRAPH (Sep. 8, 2014, 10:16 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/
11080844/Reddit-takes-down-forum-used-to-share-stolen-celebrity-photographs.html (“The news and
social networking site Reddit has removed a platform that last week allowed users to share a cache of
stolen celebrity images, many of them explicit. They included naked pictures of Jennifer Lawrence, the
Oscar-winning actress, and allegedly more than 100 other A-listers obtained by a hacker . . . .”);
Charlie Warzel, Reddit Is a Shrine to the Internet We Wanted and That’s a Problem, BUZZFEED (June
19, 2015, 3:05 PM), https://www.buzzfeed.com/charliewarzel/reddit-is-a-shrine-to-the-internet-wewanted-and-thats-a-pro?utm_term=.bwnAJV57v#.wm472kR31 (discussing Reddit’s ban of five
offensive subreddits, including /r/transfags and /r/fatpeoplehate, and noting how many users objected to
new restrictions on free speech).
76
Reddit Content Policy, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/help/contentpolicy/ (last visited Aug.
5, 2017).
77
Id. See also Removing Harassing Subreddits, REDDIT (June 10, 2015), https://np.reddit.com/
r/announcements/comments/39bpam/removing_harassing_subreddits/ (announcing Reddit’s intention
to remove subreddits that are used as tools to harass people).
78
See Reddit Content Policy, supra note 76 (restricting content commonly associated with
misogyny, such as “involuntary pornography”).
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free-speech enthusiasts voted up comments that addressed Reddit’s
Asian-American female CEO in racist and misogynist ways.79 These users
were successful enough to push the hateful comments to the site’s front
page.80 Since this episode, the company has hired more personnel to
manage or moderate subreddits and comments. Reddit today is walking a
fine line between promoting user content and touting itself as the “first
page of the Internet.”81
B. Designing User Content
The difficulty of administering an open platform that all people feel
free to join in spite of the “openness” is not unique to popular
intermediaries like YouTube and Reddit. All major online services and
applications that host user-generated content have one way or another had
to negotiate the line between free expression on the one hand and inclusion
on the other.82
In this way, provider moderation inverts the laissez-faire concerns
about content regulation because it protects users against the chill
occasioned by abusive or harassing online conduct. Moderation in this
79
Warzel, supra note 75 (“In response to the ban, scorned redditors flooded the site, using the
site’s voting mechanisms to post crude racist and sexist comments disparaging Pao. Renderings of the
CEO as a communist leader quickly hit the site’s front page. Subreddits like /r/PaoYongYang and
/r/EllenPao_IsA_Cunt popped up as well as petitions calling for her resignation.”).
80
Id.
81
In response to similar content policy reforms by other such providers, some users have begun to
lament the end of the World Wide Web or even the internet as a space for free online expression. See,
e.g., Kalev Leetaru, How Twitter’s New Censorship Tools Are the Pandora's Box Moving Us Towards
(Feb.
17,
2017,
12:02
AM),
the
End
of
Free
Speech,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2017/02/17/how-twitters-new-censorship-tools-are-thepandoras-box-moving-us-towards-the-end-of-free-speech/#45f47d2bc1e4 (discussing Twitter’s efforts
to censor unacceptable speech).
82
See, e.g., Jessica Guynn, Twitter Suspends Alt-Right Accounts, USA TODAY (Nov. 16, 2016,
8:52
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/11/15/twitter-suspends-alt-rightaccounts/93943194/ (discussing Twitter’s suspension of accounts associated with the alt-right
movement); Sarah Perez, One of the Worst Comments Sections on the Internet is Shutting Down, TECH
CRUNCH (Feb. 3, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/03/one-of-the-worst-comments-sections-onthe-internet-is-shutting-down/ (discussing Amazon’s decision to close IMDb’s discussion board due to
prevalent hateful speech). Sometimes Facebook’s automated monitoring of user content backfires.
This has been the subject of broad public scrutiny very recently. In late 2016, its popular Safety Check
feature mistakenly linked to false news stories about an explosion in Bangkok. Daniel Victor,
Facebook’s Safety Check, Now Automated, Turns a Firecracker into an Explosion, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
29, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/29/world/asia/facebook-safety-check-bangkok.html?_r=0.
The reported explosion actually occurred in the preceding year. Facebook’s News Feed and Trending
features also have come under fire in the United States for promoting and circulating “fake news.” The
company has implemented fixes for both, with fact-verification techniques drawing the most attention.
See Amber Jamieson & Olivia Solon, Facebook to Begin Flagging Fake News in Response to
Mounting Criticism, GUARDIAN (Dec. 15, 2016, 3:05 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2016/dec/15/facebook-flag-fake-news-fact-check (discussing Facebook’s efforts to fairly and
accurately fact check news reports).

224

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1

regard is anything but passive.
But moderation can only go so far in regulating online content and
conduct. It is, after all, mostly just reactive. This is where application
design matters. It is one thing for a provider to take down user content that
is inconsistent with content guidelines after it is has been posted. It is
another thing altogether to design the application to elicit or shape user
content or, conversely, ensure that certain kinds of content never see the
light of day. Application designs determine the form and substance of user
content.83
Consider the ways in which intermediaries that allow users to post
material anonymously or pseudonymously are likely to host abusive or
objectionable content.84 Users who post harmful or illegal content
reasonably assume that anonymity and pseudonymity safeguard them from
shame and rebuke.85 In this way, such design features have much to
commend them. They disinhibit users from the censorship of “political
correctness.” They embolden users to articulate ideas and views that they
would otherwise keep silent.
Application design, of course, also directly determines the form by
which users express themselves. Twitter, for example, defines the way in
which its users communicate. Users may communicate through tweets that
now must be no more than 280 characters long for distribution to either
followers or to the public at large.86 The service, moreover, enables users
to retweet others’ 280-character missives or “embed” others’ tweets in
other applications.87 Or users may share ideas through direct messages to
discrete Twitter users.88 Twitter optimizes all of this activity for use on

83
Cf. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV.
501, 508–09 (1999) (explaining how software design can regulate user conduct).
84
See, e.g., Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 402–03 (6th Cir. 2014)
(describing how Dirty World obtained stories and gossip from anonymous users). Survey data strongly
suggests that online harassment is pervasive. A Pew Research Center study found, for example, that
almost three-quarters of American adult internet users had witnessed online harassment and that two
out of five had experienced it themselves. Online Harassment, PEW RESEARCH CENT. (Oct. 22, 2014),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/10/23/12113/.
85
It is unclear whether users engage or are inclined to engage in this kind of antisocial behavior
online in ways that they would rarely engage in the physical world. See, e.g., Lee Rainie, Janna
Anderson, & Jonathan Albright, The Future of Free Speech, Trolls, Anonymity and Fake News Online,
PEW RESEARCH CENT. (Mar. 29, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/03/29/the-future-of-freespeech-trolls-anonymity-and-fake-news-online/ (discussing the difference between online and face-toface social conduct); see generally Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61
(2009).
86
New User FAQs, TWITTER HELP CTR., https://support.twitter.com/articles/13920 (last visited
Aug. 1, 2017).
87
FAQs About Retweets, TWITTER HELP CTR., https://support.twitter.com/articles/77606 (last
visited, Aug. 1, 2017).
88
New User FAQs, supra note 86.
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89

mobile devices.
Contrast these design features with an online publishing platform like
Medium, owned by Twitter’s founders.90 On the one hand, like Twitter,
Medium leaves it to users to create and edit their own content.91 But
Medium also allows long-form content and stories that are a contrast to the
characteristically punchy syntax of tweets.92 Medium also supports its own
original journalism and content.93 (Twitter, meanwhile, mainly indexes
trending news and user activity.)94 Furthermore, Medium enables users to
upvote and share content through Twitter and Facebook.95 In all of these
ways, then, we can say that Twitter is far more implicated in the user’s
choice of form and modes of distribution of content than Medium is.
Indeed, the former’s designers appear far more engaged in developing
ways to enable easy and wide distribution of tweets.
Next, contrast Twitter and Medium with so-called ephemeral
messaging applications like Snapchat and Confide—apps that enable users
to distribute content that is only accessible to chosen recipients for a short
period of time, and not, as in the case of most messaging applications,
indefinitely.96 Ephemeral messaging reflects a distinctive view about how
user-generated content may (and perhaps ought to) be shared and retained.
It makes the detection of illicit online conduct harder to record and, in this
way, encourages users to post provocative or otherwise embarrassing
content.97
An application’s design today reflects its developers’ priorities. The
form in which users can communicate (short form or long form?
anonymous or not?), the scope of other users to which users can distribute
content (to discrete application users or the public at large?), and the
availability of content over time (ephemeral messaging or not?) reflect
application developers’ view about how they want or expect users to
89
Notifications on Mobile Devices, TWITTER HELP CTR., https://support.twitter.com/
articles/20169887 (last visited, Aug. 1, 2017).
90
Josh Halliday, Twitter Founders Launch Two New Websites, Medium and Branch, THE
GUARDIAN (Aug. 15, 2012, 6:49 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/blog/2012/aug/15/
twitter-founders-new-branch-medium.
91
Id.
92
Drew Olanoff, Ev Williams Takes To Medium To Discuss The True Purpose Of His New
Publishing Tool, TECH CRUNCH (Nov. 15, 2012), https://techcrunch.com/2012/11/15/ev-williamstakes-to-medium-to-discuss-the-true-purpose-of-his-new-publishing-tool/.
93
Id.
94
New User FAQs, supra note 86.
95
Olanoff, supra note 92.
96
Frequently Asked Questions, CONFIDE, https://getconfide.com/faq (last visited Aug. 1, 2017);
Elise Moreau, What is Snapchat? An Intro to The Popular Ephemeral App, LIFEWIRE (June 13, 2017),
https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-snapchat-3485908.
97
Nathan Olivarez-Giles, Instagram Takes Aim at Snapchat with Live Video and Vanishing
Photos, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/instagram-takes-aim-at-snapchatwith-live-video-and-vanishing-photos-1479741171.
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express themselves. Today, therefore, a provider’s decision to design an
application to be ostensibly agnostic about its users’ illicit content or
online behavior suggests passivity. But it also conveys the knowing
expectation that users will post illegal and taboo online content.98
This is to say that, today, online intermediaries are not mere conduits
that purport to provide a free and uninhibited forum for social interaction.
They are implicated in every user utterance or act, even if they do not
moderate posts.
C. Antisocial Designs
But we can go even further in our account of service or application
designs. Sometimes, as I suggest above, developers’ designs encourage
user content that causes material injury, as in the case of the Twitter user
who sent a direct message containing an animated strobe-light effect to a
journalist known to suffer from epilepsy.99 It is in spite of these potential
harms, however, that the social media company enables its users to
disguise their identities. Twitter does so in the interest of cultivating a
forum for uninhibited online interaction, knowing all along someone will
inevitably get hurt.
Anonymity or pseudonymity can be dangerous. Other application
designs also facilitate predictable harms. Consider the way in which users
search for rides and guests through ride-sharing applications and
short-term homestay marketplaces.
One recent study found that
African-American passengers in Seattle wait up to 35-percent longer for
98
There are some providers that have remained indifferent if not altogether defiant about hosting
illicit or otherwise objectionable third-party content. These companies purport to do nothing more than
connect users, many of whom happen to have objectionable tastes. While large providers like
YouTube or Facebook may be wary of broad consumer distaste for objectionable content that passes
through their applications, others are not because there is monetizable demand for it. Such a provider
can create an adults-only or otherwise restricted platform through which users may trade and share
taboo or objectionable material. But such a service would likely not last long. Consider Craigslist, the
online classified site. It closed its adults-only section in 2010 after a series of shocking events arising
from advertisements and solicitations on the site. Claire Cain Miller, Craigslist Says It Has Shut Its
Section for Sex Ads, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/16/
business/16craigslist.html. BackPage soon picked up where Craigslist left off, but its adults-only
section did not last long after revelations about the way in which its users engaged in sex trafficking of
minors. Matt Hamilton, BackPage Shuts Down Adult Section, Citing Government Pressure and
Unlawful Censorship Campaign, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/lame-ln-backpage-shutdown-20170109-story.html.
99
See, e.g., Eriq Gardner, Newsweek Writer Going After Twitter User for Allegedly Causing
Seizure, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Dec. 19, 2016), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thresq/newsweek-writer-goes-twitter-user-allegedly-causing-seizure-957631 (reporting on Newsweek
writer Kurt Eichenwald’s suit against a Twitter user who allegedly sent him an email intending to cause
a seizure); Ana Silman, A Timeline of Leslie Jones’s Horrific Online Abuse, N.Y. MAG. (Aug. 24,
2016),
http://nymag.com/thecut/2016/08/a-timeline-of-leslie-joness-horrific-online-abuse.html
(reporting on the viciously racist and sexist internet trolling of actress and comedian Leslie Jones).
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Uber cars than white passengers.
The researchers attributed the longer
wait time to drivers who cancel trips upon hearing that the passenger has
an “African American sounding first name.”101 Male passengers who
requested a ride from a low-density area, moreover, were more than
three-times as likely to have the Uber driver cancel the trip when the
passenger uses an African-American-sounding name as compared to a
white-sounding name.102
An even more publicized survey by scholars at Harvard Business
School reported similar findings in its review of rental booking patterns on
Airbnb, the homestay sharing application.103 According to the report,
Airbnb guests “with distinctively African-American names are 16-percent
less likely to be accepted relative to identical guests with distinctively
White names.”104 Airbnb’s own study on the topic found, moreover, that
hosts discriminate against racial minorities whose profile pictures
ostensibly present themselves as such.105
In the case of Uber and Airbnb, the choice to publicize personal
information through names and pictures is a design choice. In the case of
Airbnb in particular, user pictures are meant to engender a sense of
authenticity and connection among hosts and guests.106 (This is in contrast
to the authenticity that Twitter seeks to engender through pseudonymity.)
But, of course, it is in this same way that Uber drivers and Airbnb hosts
might eschew connections with people with whom they feel less
comfortable on the basis of racist stereotypes. The features that mean to
foster authentic connection also reinforce bias and exclusion.
Facebook offers a compelling illustration of this point as well. The
online social networking application is well-known for its mission to
connect the world.107 With this ambition in mind, the company has
invested a substantial amount of resources into developing features (e.g.,
the scrolling News Feed or Trending feature) and services (e.g., Free
Basics) that are meant to keep users connected.108
100

Yanbo Ge et al., Racial and Gender Discrimination in Transportation Network Companies 2
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22776, 2016).
101
Id. at 11–12.
102
Id. at 19.
103
Edelman et al., supra note 18, at 2.
104
Id. at 1.
105
MURPHY, supra note 21, at 16–17.
106
Id. at 11, 17.
107
Associated Press, Zuckerberg's Goal: Remake a World Facebook Helped Create, L.A. TIMES
(Feb. 17, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-tn-zuckerberg-vision-20170217-story.html.
108
See Newsroom, A New Look for News Feed, FACEBOOK (Mar. 7, 2013),
http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2013/03/a-new-look-for-news-feed/ (discussing new features of the
Facebook News Feed design implemented in 2013); see also Facebook For Developers, What’s Free
Basics?, FACEBOOK, https://developers.facebook.com/docs/internet-org (last visited Aug. 1, 2017)
(describing the Free Basics service which provides basic internet functionality to a billion people across
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Ostensibly in keeping with this practice, the company launched an
advertising service in 2014.109 Through it, advertisers may “microtarget”
small or fleeting niche audiences that might otherwise be hard to reach.110
Facebook assigns an “affinity” designation by applying proprietary tools
for algorithmic analysis to its vast reserve of user data.111 The company
forms the affinities around a particularly salient bundle of user data.112
The users to whom the advertisements are distributed play no active role in
determining the designations that Facebook assigns them.113 They only
need to keep liking, sharing, scrolling, and building friend networks—that
is, they only need to continue using the social media application.114
Controversially, Facebook’s service offers “ethnic affinities” as a
category which advertisers can use to microtarget their campaigns.115
Through the advertising service, a hypothetical business manager could
distribute ads for a rental unit to users with an African-American “ethnic
affinity” or, just as easily, exclude such users from the advertisement.
Employers, too, could use the service to look for new recruits, again,
singling out users for inclusion or exclusion based on the category
designation.
While the advertising service has been available since 2014,
ProPublica’s reporting on this feature of the service in late 2016 drew a lot
of attention.116 Public reaction to the report was mixed, if not altogether
negative.117 Within one month, Facebook discontinued the “ethnic
affinity” designation and clarified its privacy and advertising policy to

Latin America, Africa, and Asia); Vadim Lavrusik, How the New News Feed Design Improves Content
Discovery, FACEBOOK (Mar. 7, 2013), https://www.facebook.com/notes/journalists-on-facebook/howthe-new-news-feed-design-improves-content-discovery/571743776170974/ (discussing the introduction
of categorized and real time content feeds to the Facebook News Feed design in 2013).
109
Alex Hern, Facebook Is Trying to Explain How Its New ‘Ethnic Affinity’ Ads Aren’t Really
Racial Profiling, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 22, 2016, 10:57 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/facebooktrying-to-explain-its-new-ethnic-affinity-ads-2016-3.
110
Angwin & Parris, supra note 16.
111
Id.
112
See Hern, supra note 109 (stating that “liking” certain racially-coded pages indicates a user’s
ethnic affinity).
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Angwin & Parris, supra note 16.
116
Id. Following the ProPublica reporting, numerous other news outlets picked up the story. A
Google search for derivative coverage yields more than a dozen other articles citing the ProPublica
reporting. Search Query, GOOGLE, www.google.com (search “ProPublica Facebook article ethnic
affinity microtargeting”).
117
The report could not have come at a worse time for Facebook, as the social media company
was also defending against separate allegations that the company engaged in viewpoint censorship,
secretly collaborated with law enforcement to surveil users, and did not moderate fake news.
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make plain that it does not approve of racial discrimination.
It later
launched a new “multicultural affinity” filter, ostensibly to be less
equivocal about the original classification.119 (“Multicultural” presumably
connotes something more positive.) These reforms, however, were not
enough to stop aggrieved users from filing a class-action lawsuit in the
Northern District of California against Facebook (and brokers and lessors)
in late 2016. Plaintiffs allege that, through the advertising service,
Facebook enables users to discriminate against prospective renters and
employers in violation of the federal FHA and antidiscrimination in
employment provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.120 One year
later, Facebook reportedly continues to enable discrimination against
protected classes under the FHA.121
Facebook has three overlapping answers to the charge that it was or is
violating the FHA. First, it observes that it is common for advertisers to
target audiences in exactly the way that it did with the “ethnic affinities”
feature.122 The fragmented and diverse nature of the market makes it
important for advertisers to know their audience with more granularity.123
Thus, it argues, it is unremarkable to exclude, for example, the “Hispanic
affinity group” from an English-language advertisement.124 Second,
Facebook argues that its policies forbid “advertisers from using the
targeting options for discrimination, harassment, disparagement or
predatory advertising practices.”125 The company promptly removes such
118
Gillian B. White, When Algorithms Don’t Account for Civil Rights, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 7,
2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/03/facebook-ad-discrimination/518718/;
Improving Enforcement and Promoting Diversity: Updates to Ads Policies and Tools, supra note 25.
119
White, supra note 118; Improving Enforcement and Promoting Diversity: Updates to Ads
Policies and Tools, supra note 25.
120
Complaint ¶¶ 24–33, Mobley v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:16-cv-06440-EJD (N.D. Cal. Nov. 3,
2016), 2016 WL 6599689. The federal FHA forbids home sellers or renters from distributing
advertisements “that indicate[] any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2017). The law also,
of course, forbids discrimination on the basis of those characteristics as well. Id. § 3604(b). The
statute also provides that it is unlawful “to discriminate against any person in terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling” along those demographic dimensions. Id. Among other
things, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act makes it unlawful for an employer “(1) to fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2017).
121
See Julia Angwin, Ariana Tobin, and Madeleine Varner, Facebook (Still) Letting Housing
Advertisers Exclude Users by Race, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.propublica.org/
article/facebook-advertising-discrimination-housing-race-sex-national-origin?utm_campaign
=sprout&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter&utm_content=1511288776.
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Angwin & Parris, supra note 16.
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Id.
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ads (and perhaps even suspends or terminates accounts of violators) when
it receives notice of them.126 Third, Facebook does not concede that
“ethnic affinity” is protected under fair housing law.127 That designation
“is not,” it argued, “the same as race.”128 It only represents an algorithmic
judgment based on a mix of salient user data, in the same way, for
example, that age, relationship status, employment history, or page-like
patterns may suggest something about a user’s inclination to shop.
We can assume for the purposes of argument that Facebook’s reasons
for offering the advertising service are not overtly racist. Nor does it seem
that its design choices to identify “ethnic affinity” and enable advertisers to
affirmatively exclude (as opposed to include) audiences on that basis were
meant to discriminate against racial minorities.129 Facebook launched the
advertising service presumably to leverage its social network in other lines
of business. In this case, Facebook probably believed that its distinctively
powerful capacity to process and sort user data could enlarge users’
communicative capacity. Facebook, under this view, was only acting as a
mere conduit between advertisers and users.
But such an approach is either naïve or careless or worse. It was
predictable to the point of being inevitable that advertisers would use
Facebook’s “ethnic” or “multicultural affinity” classifications to
discriminate against people of color. Today, race overdetermines the
distribution of material resources in this country to the systemic detriment
of people of color. Well-documented patterns of racial discrimination
online prove the point. A Stanford study from 2010 found that black
sellers receive fewer offers and less money than white sellers when the
seller’s race is evident in an accompanying photo.130 Consider, moreover,
the ways in which users discriminate against blacks on online dating sites
like Match. Or consider crowdsourced neighborhood safety rating
applications like the now-defunct SketchFactor that served as little more
than a platform for racist stereotypes about “shady” parts of town.131
This recent Facebook advertising episode just underscores that, in its
purported role as conduit between advertisers and buyers, Facebook
facilitates material bias against disfavored groups. More pertinently, it
126
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Id.
128
Id.
129
For equal protection and civil rights enforcement, Facebook’s intentions would matter a great
127

deal.
130
See Louis Bergeron, Online Shoppers More Likely to Buy from White Sellers than Black,
Stanford Researchers Say, STANFORD NEWS (July 19, 2010), http://news.stanford.edu/news/2010/july/
hands-craigslist-study-071910.html (discussing research later published in Jennifer L. Doleac & Luke
C.D. Stein, The Visible Hand: Race and Online Market Outcomes, 123 ECON. J. 469 (2013)).
131
Andrew Marantz, When an App Is Called Racist, NEW YORKER (July 29, 2015),
https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/what-to-do-when-your-app-is-racist.
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illustrates that ostensibly passive application design is far more generative
of bad behavior than the Section 230 doctrine adequately addresses. This
recent controversy raises questions about the scope of immunity under
Section 230 as it relates to application design.132 But, before saying more,
it is important to understand the current immunity doctrine and how it
came to take this form. I turn to that next.
II. THE PREVAILING IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
Courts have read Section 230 broadly on the theory that online
intermediaries should not be held liable if, as publishers, they are mere
conduits for user-generated content. The current doctrine specifically
provides that intermediaries are only liable if they materially contribute to
the illegal or otherwise objectionable online conduct.133 Courts reason that
online entrepreneurship and speech would be chilled if providers had the
heavy burden of policing their users’ online content.134 In this Part, I
explain the manner in which the courts have come to this standard. This
analysis also offers important lessons on whether the doctrine has anything
to say about the duties intermediaries owe for their designs. Could courts
apply the material contribution standard to each design? If so, how
affecting must that design be in order for an intermediary to be liable for
the unlawful conduct of its third-party users?

132
We can expect Facebook to invoke Section 230 in its defense of the Northern District of
California suit. The company has not been shy about relying on that provision in other cases addressed
to the illegal behavior of third-party Facebook users. See, e.g., Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354,
1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (holding that Section 230 mandated dismissal of the plaintiff’s negligence claims
against Facebook); Finkel v. Facebook, Inc., No. 102578/09, 2009 WL 3240365 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept.
15, 2009) (dismissing a defamation action against Facebook, again due to its immunity from suit under
Section 230).
133
See Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, 755 F.3d 398, 408 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[I]f a
website operator is in part responsible for the creation or development of content, then it is an
information content provider as to that content—and is not immune from claims predicated on it.”
(citation omitted)).
134
Id. at 407, 417.
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A. The Statutory Text
The pertinent provision, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), is entitled “Protection for
‘Good Samaritan’ Blocking and Screening of Offensive Material.”135 The
plain language is relatively straightforward. Section 230(c)(1), whose
subtitle is “Treatment of publisher or speaker,” provides: “No provider or
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider.”136 Under the statute, an “interactive computer service” mainly
denotes services that “provide[] access to the Internet.”137
Section 230(c)(1) does far more work than its plain language suggests.
The term “publisher or speaker” refers to an entity that participates in or
authorizes the publication of content.138 It is generally associated with the
claim for defamation, which, to be successful, requires evidence of the
intentional or negligent publication of defamatory material about a plaintiff
to a third person.139
Under the “republication rule” in defamation law the duties of a
“publisher” are especially important. A publisher, the rule holds, is strictly
liable for repeating defamatory statements by third parties to the extent the
publisher intentionally circulates the material or just fails to take
reasonable care to prevent its publication.140 Publishers in this scheme
include book publishers, newspapers, radio or television stations, and other
entities that exercise editorial control over the content that they publish.141
A publisher is in this way just as liable for circulating the defamatory
statements as the entity who originally authored them.142 The rule exists to
protect others from the harm done by the repeated distribution of an illegal

135

47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2017).
Id. § 230(c)(1).
137
The pertinent definition of “interactive computer service” under the statute is as follows:
“[A]ny information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer
access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides
access to the internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational
institutions.” Id. § 230(f)(2).
138
Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 520 (Cal. 2006) (“Those terms, employed in section
230(c)(1), are drawn from the law of defamation.”). There are reasons to doubt that defamation should
be our guide, at least because the provision here refers to “publisher or speaker,” the latter not being
tied to defamation doctrine. See id. at 513 (emphasis added) (providing a statement by Congress in the
Communications Decency Act of 1996).
139
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
140
See id. § 578; see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 113 (5th ed. 1984) (detailing the basis of liability).
141
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568A; id. § 577A.
142
See id. § 578. See generally Benjamin C. Zipursky, Lecture, Online Defamation, Legal
Concepts, and the Good Samaritan, 51 VAL. U. L. REV 1 (2016) (performing a thorough analysis of
republication rule).
136

2018]

INTERMEDIARY DESIGN DUTIES

233

143

utterance.
Without the rule, the logic goes, “defamers could too easily
sidestep any possible liability by putting words into another’s mouth.”144
The old common law rule carved out a species of publisher that
distributes or otherwise “deliver[s] or transmit[s]” defamatory material
published by a third person.145 These distributors, as they are called in the
doctrine, are only liable to the extent they know or have reason to know
that the material is illegal.146 That is, they are subject to notice liability.
Conventional examples of distributors are newsstands and bookstores.147
A distributor, under this view, could not be liable for distributing a user’s
defamatory statement about a third party unless the aggrieved party could
show that the distributor’s failure to know of the defamatory nature of the
statement was negligent or that the distributor failed to remove the material
once it gained knowledge of it.148 Publishers, on the other hand, could be
liable whether they know the material is defamatory or not.
Section 230(c)(1) reforms the old common law by effectively shielding
providers of “interactive computer services” from liability for content that
third-party users circulate through the online service.149 The statute further
clarifies the extent of this immunity in its definition of “information
content provider,” which it describes as “any person or entity that is
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive
computer service.”150 With this, a provider could be liable for content that
appears on its service to the extent the provider actively helps in the
“creation or development” of the objectionable material.151
Alone, this reform of the republication rule would be significant.
Section 230(c)(1) shields service providers from liability for exercising
editorial judgment about content. A service will only be liable to the
extent it is responsible at least in part for the “creation or development” of
the content that it publishes.152
143

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 576; id. § 577.
Zipursky, supra note 142, at 5.
145
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578; see also Church of Scientology of Minn. v. Minn.
State Med. Ass’n Found., 264 N.W.2d 152, 156 (Minn. 1978) (“Those who merely deliver or transmit
defamatory material previously published by another will be considered to have published the material
only if they knew, or had reason to know, that the material was false and defamatory.”).
146
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581; see also Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 513
(Cal. 2006) (“Under the common law, ‘distributors’ like newspaper vendors and book sellers are liable
only if they had notice of a defamatory statement in their merchandise.”).
147
Barrett, 146 P.3d at 513.
148
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577(2).
149
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2017). The statute explicitly preempts state tort law. Section 230(e)(3)
provides, among other things, that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be
imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” Id. § 230(e)(3).
150
Id. § 230(f)(3).
151
Id.
152
Id.
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As significant as the reform in Section 230(c)(1) is, a couple
subsequent provisions do more. Section 230(c)(2), entitled “Civil
liability,”153 takes up Section 230(c)’s evocative “Good Samaritan”154 title
in ways that Section 230(c)(1) does not.155 Quite unlike Section 230(c)(1),
Section 230(c)(2) identifies specific circumstances for applying the
immunity: that is, when an interactive computer service takes steps in good
faith to take down objectionable material or help others to do so.156 This
immunity presumably exists for blocking and removing constitutionally
protected material like core political speech as well as speech like
defamation or obscenity that is not protected.157 Section 230(c)(2),
moreover, shields interactive computer services to the extent they “enable
or make available to information content providers or others the technical
means to restrict access to material described in paragraph (1).”158
Section 230(d), the following subsection, obliges interactive computer
services to inform their users that “computer hardware, software, or
filtering services” exist to “limit[] access to material that is harmful to
minors.”159 This provision does not come paired with an enforcement
mechanism. Nor, for that matter, do Sections 230(c)(1) or 230(c)(2)(A).
But those two latter provisions operate as affirmative defenses, to be
invoked by interactive computer services in litigation. Section 230(d), on
the other hand, reads as little more than a strongly worded but
unenforceable mandate.
In any event, both (c) and (d), and especially the former, presume that
voluntary market-driven norms will guide the regulation of objectionable
online content rather than government enforced mandates. They depend
on interactive computer services for their implementation. While the
online setting has been relatively new to the common law, the challenge of
encouraging (without requiring) good deeds through law is not.160 The
Good Samaritan statutes in the states long preceded the internet.161
Through these, state legislatures sought to balance competing
considerations in ways that are instructive. On the one hand, the states
153

Id. § 230(c)(2).
Id § 230(c).
155
The latter makes no allusion at all to the biblical parable. See Luke 10:25–37.
156
Section 230(c)(2) shields interactive computer services that have voluntarily taken steps in
good faith to censor or take down “material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such
material is constitutionally protected.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
157
Id.
158
Id. § 230(c)(2)(B).
159
Id. § 230(d).
160
See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
161
Zipursky, supra note 142, at 31.
154
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have wanted to encourage strangers to help victims. On the other, the
common law does not impose duties to help strangers in need.162 Instead,
do-gooders can be liable under common law for causing injuries that arise
from their efforts to treat down-and-out strangers with kindness.163 Thus,
in the face of a common-law rule that arguably disincentivizes the
Good Samaritan, state legislatures have passed laws that one way or
another shield defendant do-gooders from liability.164
Section 230(c)(2) embodies this same effort, but in the online setting.
It ostensibly aims to preserve the affirmative duty to restrict access to
objectionable content to the extent the defendant service at issue “has
undertaken to” do so.165
This approach distinguishes Section 230 from most other provisions
addressed to illegal or objectionable content in the Communications Act.
Other parts of the statute, for example, strictly bar the transmission of
obscenity, child pornography, or harassing content and, moreover,
explicitly enlist officials at the Department of Justice and the Federal
Communications Commission to impose financial penalties on violators
and bring criminal and civil forfeiture actions.166 In contrast, government
regulators play no part in monitoring and regulating content that users
share over the internet through “interactive computer services.”167
B. Legislative Intent
1. Prefatory Words
It is not easy to balance the interest in promoting user-generated
content against the voluntary regulation of objectionable online content.
But that is exactly what the drafters of Section 230 purported to do.
Congress explicitly set out the findings and policies on which it based the
immunity in Sections 230(a) and (b). The internet, the statute asserts,
affords users “a great degree of control over” the “extraordinary” array of
“educational and informational resources” they receive.168 This finding
restates one of the foundational design principles of the internet: that the
substantive intelligence of information networks should reside with end162

Id.
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id. at 35.
166
See 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(a), 223(b)(6) (2017) (discussing prohibited acts and the Attorney
General’s authority to enforce the statute); 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2017) (discussing prohibitions against the
broadcasting obscene language).
167
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2017) (stating that users of an interactive computer service will not
be considered a “publisher or speaker” of any information provided by another information content
provider).
168
47 U.S.C. §§ 230(a)(1)–(3).
163
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users and not, as had been the case, in the central offices of newspaper
publishers or broadcast producers, for example. This approach jibes, too,
with an emergent liberal political theory with which this engineering
concept is often associated.169 Indeed, along these lines, Congress
observed in their statutory findings that the internet is a “forum for a true
diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity.”170 This
statutory recital has been an article of faith among policymakers and lay
observers, at least since the Supreme Court’s first prominent take on the
technology two decades ago.171 Congress also found in this section that the
“variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services”
online have “flourished . . . with a minimum of government regulation.”172
Section 230(b) enumerates the policies underlying the protection for
intermediaries. There, legislators provide that the statute’s aim is “to
promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive
computer services and other interactive media”;173 “preserve the vibrant
and competitive free market . . . unfettered by Federal or State
regulation”;174 and to “maximize user control over what information is
received by individuals, families, and schools,” which includes
encouraging “the development and utilization of blocking and filtering
technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to
objectionable or inappropriate online material . . . .”175 Finally, through
Section 230, Congress sought “to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal
criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and
harassment by means of computer.”176
As clear as these introductory provisions are, courts have yet to cohere
them (at least explicitly) with the legislative purpose that the New Deal-era
Congress explicitly set out in Section 151 of the Communications Act, the
first provision of the statute that Section 230 amends.177 That older
provision mainly provides that the purpose of the statute is “to ensur[e] that
communication technology is widely available to all users irrespective of

169
See YOCHAI BENKLER, WEALTH OF NETWORKS 133 (2006) (discussing individual agency,
technology, and the rights of end-users versus publishers and broadcasters).
170
47 U.S.C. §§ 230(a)(1)–(3).
171
See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849–850 (1997) (discussing the role of the internet and how
access provides opportunities to users).
172
47 U.S.C. §§ 230(a)(4)–(5).
173
Id. § 230(b)(1).
174
Id. § 230(b)(2).
175
Id. § 230(b)(3)–(4).
176
Id. § 230(b)(5).
177
47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012); see also Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 652–654 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (rejecting the argument that Sections 151 and 230 authorized the agency action at issue).
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who or where they are.”
This language is not in tension with the
“findings” or “policy” underlying Section 230. It nevertheless suggests
that, to the extent courts attend to the statutory purposes of Section 230,
they would do well to consider the distributional interests that rest at the
heart of the Communications Act, of which Section 230 is just a part.
2. Legislative History
These prefatory terms are notable for their clarity.179 But they are
especially valuable because the legislative history of Section 230 is
relatively spare on what Congress meant to accomplish with the statute.
To the extent the legislative history suggests anything, it does not square
easily with all of the plain language.
The bill that would become Section 230 was part of a much larger
legislative reform of communications law addressed in particular to
competition in the market for last-mile telecommunications service.180
Senators James Exon and Slade Gorton introduced the bill, Title V of the
proposed Telecommunications Act, to the Senate Committee of
Commerce, Science, and Transportation.181 Among other things, the
Exon-Gorton bill contained government-enforced restrictions on indecent
and obscene online speech, as well as the enforcement provisions to which
I allude above.182 But it also included two new defenses to liability: first,
an immunity for providers that only supply internet access and, second, an
immunity for providers that take good-faith efforts to prevent third-party
users’ publication of obscene or indecent material.
The House bill that went to conference also contained an immunity
provision.183 But Representatives Christopher Cox and Ron Wyden only
moved to include it after the House Energy and Commerce Committee had
already reported the pertinent bill out to the full chamber without one.184
Cox and Wyden intended their proposed language to be an alternative to

178

Sylvain, supra note 43, at 459.
See Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 652–54 (discussing statutory terms and the areas over which
the FCC has authority); Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (discussing statutory
terms and the areas that fall within the purview of the FCC).
180
See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (enacting the
Communications Decency Act as Section V of the overall reform act).
181
See 141 CONG. REC. S1953 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon) (introducing the
Communications Decency Act on behalf of himself and Senator Gorton).
182
See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 864 (1997) (striking down obscenity and indecency laws
within one year of their implementation).
183
See 104 CONG. REC. H8469 (statement of Rep. Cox) (reading the proposed amendment, which
contained a Good Samaritan immunity provision).
184
See id. at H8468 (statement of Rep. Cox) (offering an amendment after the reading of the bill
to include the Good Samaritan provision, in addition to others).
179
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the Exon-Gorton language.185 Its main purpose was to overrule a 1995
New York state trial court opinion that had found Prodigy, an early online
service, liable for defamatory statements made by another user on one of
the service’s bulletin board services.186 Relying on the common law
regarding publisher liability, that court had decided that Prodigy was a
“publisher” and, thus, just as liable for libelous statements made by any of
its subscribers. The court explained, moreover, that Prodigy had marketed
itself as having editorial control over the content that flowed through its
service and, as a result, should be held to account for failing to remove the
offending content.187
Representatives Cox and Wyden saw the Prodigy opinion as a
dangerous incursion on the free flow of information online.188 They, as
with the then-nascent internet industry, believed that the opinion would
open the door to litigation against well-meaning services. The Cox-Wyden
bill sought to encourage private “Good Samaritan” providers like Prodigy
to filter objectionable content without fear of punishment for doing so
ineffectively.189 Above all, Cox and Wyden proposed the bill as an
alternative to direct government restrictions on speech, believing that
“parents and families are better suited to guard the portals of cyberspace
and protect our children than our Government bureaucrats.”190 Under the
approach set out in their amendment, they explained, “the marketplace is
going to give parents the tools they need,” while the alternative set out by
the Senate bill would “set back the effort to help our families.”191
185
See id. at H8470 (statement of Rep. Cox) (comparing their approach with that of “other ways
to address this problem”); id. (statement of Rep. Wyden) (noting that their proposal language in the
House “stand[s] in sharp contrast to the work of the other body”).
186
See id. (statement of Rep. Cox) (discussing the purposes of the proposed amendment).
187
See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May
24, 1995), superseded by 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), as recognized in Shiamili v. Real Estate Group of New
York, Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 281 (2011).
188
See 141 CONG. REC. H8460 (1995) (statement of Rep. Cox.) (discussing disincentives that
exist in the legal system that prevent free-flowing online information).
189
See id. (discussing the protection of Good Samaritans, online service providers that take steps
to screen offensive material for customers).
190
Id. (statement of Rep. Wyden); see also id. (statement of Rep. Cox) (“[The proposed bill] will
establish as the policy of the United States that we do not wish to have content regulation by the
Federal Government of what is on the internet, that we do not wish to have a Federal Computer
Commission with an army of bureaucrats regulating the internet because frankly the internet as grown
up to be what it is without that kind of help from the Government. In this fashion we can encourage
what is right now the most energetic technological revolution that any of us has ever witnessed.”).
191
Id. Their justification was (and remains) at odds with the federal courts’ holding that direct
government regulation of indecency and obscenity furthers the government’s compelling interest in
parental control of the information to which children are exposed. See, e.g., Sable Communications v.
FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 119 (1989) (discussing the government’s interest in protecting users of online
service providers from indecent material); FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978) (discussing the
government’s interest in protecting the well-being of online service providers by regulating protected
expression); Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 629 (1968) (discussing the use of government
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The conference committee bill that both chambers approved
incorporated the Cox-Wyden formulation.192 The accompanying report
explained that “one of the specific purposes” of the amendment was to
overrule the Prodigy opinion in order to further the “important federal
policy of empowering parents to determine the content of communications
their children receive through interactive computer services.”193 This
statement of purpose underscores that legislators mainly chose against a
flat-out restriction on objectionable material. The drafters believed that
parents are the better stewards of the online content that their children
consume than governmental officials.
But neither the conference committee report nor legislators’ statements
about the amendment reveal anything about the scope of notice liability for
service providers or the affirmative duty of interactive service providers to
screen objectionable content. That is, neither says anything about how
proactively interactive computer services like Prodigy must monitor
third-party users’ content on their services or filter out objectionable
material under the new law.
We might assume that this silence suggests that the amendment
immunizes all providers from any liability arising from third-party content.
But this is hard to square with a plain reading of the statute. Section
230(c)(2)(A) encourages websites to keep objectionable content out
without fear of liability for failing to do so well. The following provision,
Section 230(c)(2)(B), immunizes services that “make available to
information content providers or others the technical means to restrict”
objectionable content. The plain language of (c)(2) suggests that these are
the operative reasons for immunity.194
The legislative history also offers little in the way of explanation for
these specific provisions. Again, the history only suggests that Congress
did not want the Prodigy court’s unforgiving interpretation of the
republication rule in the online setting to stand. To the extent members
said anything about the bill, it was that they were interested in enacting a
statutory scheme that would empower parents to monitor their children’s
access to online content over a scheme that encouraged or even required
websites to assume that responsibility.195 This stated purpose does not help
regulations to protect minors from harmful material). The scheme that Cox and Wyden laid out
invoked the parental control rationale to remove government speech regulation.
192
See 142 CONG. REC. S687, S688 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (discussing the passage of the bill by
the two houses).
193
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996, H.R. Rep. No. 104-58, at 194 (1996).
194
47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(2)(a)–(b) (2012).
195
See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 758 (discussing the trend in Constitutional interpretation recognizing
parents’ authority to decide what negative content children are exposed to); Ginsburg, 390 U.S. at 639
(describing the parents’ authority to direct the rearing of their children as basic in the structure of our
society).
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shed light on whether services that do not take steps in good faith to filter
out objectionable content (firms unlike Prodigy) are entitled to the
immunity under Section 230. Consider that, four years before the state
court weighed in, a U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York had ruled that a similar service, CompuServe, could not be held liable
to the extent it did not market or distribute defamatory material by
third-party users.196
Congress only further complicated things when, in 1998, it amended
Section 230 (for the first and last time) with a new subsection (d) which, as
I explain above, requires providers to inform their users about filtering
technologies.197 This requirement is mostly toothless, as Congress did not
pair it with an enforcement mechanism. And it only appears to be
addressed to the kind of unprotected content that the courts and
policymakers believe harms children (i.e., obscenity and indecency), not
all other categories of objectionable or illegal speech. So, while it
reinforces the view that Congress was primarily focused on making parents
the stewards of the information that their children receive online on the one
hand, the provision does not explain how far providers must go or whether
immunity under Section 230(c) is conditioned on giving notice to users
about parental control protections.
C. Statutory Ambiguities
The thinness of the legislative history on service providers’ affirmative
duties to moderate content under Section 230 created an opening for
litigants. There is little question that Congress sought to “modernize” the
republication rule in the final language. But how far did the reform go?
The exact scope of protection under the plain terms of the provision is not
evident from the text and the legislative history teaches us little. In order
to know whether it covers application design, however, the answer to that
question is important if not dispositive.
1. Which Torts?
We do not know from its text, for example, whether Section 230(c)
immunizes service providers from all tort liability arising from third-party
user content. On the one hand, Section 230(c)(1) is unequivocal, asserting
without qualification that “No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as a publisher or speaker of any information

196

Cubby v. Compuserve, 776 F. Supp. 135, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
See supra Section II.A (discussing a lack of an explicit enforcement mechanism in the
language of the statute).
197
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provided by another information content provider.”
This presumably
covers all torts arising from expressive acts by third parties.
But there is also enough in the statute to limit the scope of the
protection to publisher liability in defamation law, as well as liability for
publishing third-party indecency and obscenity. First, the question of
whether a service may be treated as a “publisher or speaker” is specific to
the doctrine of defamation. It is not germane to other torts like fraud or
unfair competition. Nor is it clear whether this sense of “publisher”
includes notice liability normally associated with distributors in defamation
law. Courts could just decide that the statute does not reach further than
publisher liability for defamation or other reputational torts, thus exposing
distributors and others to liability. Second, if the legislative history of
Section 230(c) teaches anything certain, it is that Congress sought to
overturn the Prodigy court’s application of defamation to an online bulletin
board. We can infer from this alone that defamation was the cause of
action that drove Congress to act.
The only other expressive torts to which Congress explicitly turned its
attention in the text are third-party communications that the courts have
deemed “objectionable” or otherwise harmful to minors.
Section
230(c)(2), the provision that shields Good Samaritans, and Section 230(d),
the provision that imposes the obligation to notify parent users about
filtering technologies, are both addressed to protecting minors from
objectionable content.199 Recall, moreover, that the original Title V
amendment included flat-out restrictions on the distribution of obscenity
and indecency, categories of speech from which legislators have long
sought to shield children.200 This earlier version of the bill covered nothing
else. Finally, in the precatory “policy” recitation at the outset of the
statute, Congress sought to encourage “individuals, families, and schools”
to use “blocking and filtering technologies” to protect children from
“objectionable or inappropriate online material.”201 Congress endorsed this
view in Section 230(d), the 1998 amendment, by imposing an additional
duty on providers to educate parents about filtering technologies.202
With this textual evidence, we might not read Section 230(c) as
unequivocal at all, but, rather, as limiting the range of protection to
providers that, on the one hand, publish third-party communications that
damage a plaintiff user’s reputation and, on the other hand, take good-faith
steps to screen content that is “objectionable” or otherwise harmful to
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47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)–(d).
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The Supreme Court struck down that provision in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997).
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47 U.S.C. §§ 230(b)(3)–(4).
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children.203 Congress was demonstrably mindful of those expressive torts
in the text and legislative history and essentially silent about all others.
This narrower interpretation of the statute follows the traditional canon
of construction that legislators do not “hide elephants in mouse holes.”204
Congress would surely have been far more explicit about a broader scope
of protection had it meant to so radically reform the republication rule.205
In any event, the narrower reading that I posit here would encourage the
kind of sociability and altruism one would expect from a statutory
provision that, in its title, explicitly seeks to protect Good Samaritans from
liability for their good-faith efforts.
2. How Much Creation and Development?
We also do not know from the statute’s plain terms or the legislative
history what kind of activity constitutes “creation or development” under
Section 230(f)(3), the statutory definition of “information content
developer.”206 A website’s design necessarily determines the way in which
users express themselves, whether by video, photo, text, or mere click, for
example.
After all, as I explain above, the form of an online
communication (say, a Facebook advertisement, a Medium post, a Tweet,
or a YouTube clip) is contingent on the interactive computer service’s
design.207 This is to say nothing of the far thornier question of whether,
today, at a time when algorithmic prediction and machine learning
determine most users’ online experiences, interactive computer services
that employ these techniques are “creat[ing] or develop[ing]” content
within the meaning of Section 230(f).208
D. Judicial Elaborations
Courts have assumed the responsibility of determining whether and to
what extent online intermediaries owe any affirmative duties to manage
their users’ content or conduct. Over the past two decades, they have read
203
See Sherman v. Yahoo, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1137 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (“A plain reading of the
statute indicates protection is intended only for the ‘blocking and screening of offensive material.’”).
204
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (citation omitted).
205
See MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 228–29 (1994) (discussing narrow exceptions in
Communications Act as evidence of the narrow meaning of the operative term). See also King v.
Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2495 (2015) (discussing Congress’ tendency to avoid vague terms when
altering regulatory schemes); Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)
(discussing Congress’ tendency to avoid making changes to a regulatory scheme in a cryptic fashion).
206
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (2012).
207
See supra Section B (discussing how application designs determine the form and substance of
user content). See, e.g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003)
(discussing matchmaker website’s questionnaire and how it facilitated expression of information by
individual users).
208
See supra Part I.
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the immunity under Section 230 broadly, despite the complications I
suggest above.209 First, they generally hold that the statute shields services
from liability for all expressive torts by third parties, not just those that are
reputational or harmful to children. Second, most courts have determined
that the statute shields companies that do anything but elicit illegal or
objectionable content from third parties by design. So, it is not enough that
a service’s administrators do not block or remove illegal content or,
alternatively, solicit illicit material. Moderation of user content no longer
seems to matter for the purposes of applying the immunity. Online
intermediaries lose their immunity only if they have a hand in creating the
illegal content or otherwise violate a separate duty that does not arise from
the publishing event.210
This prevailing approach resonates with the longstanding skepticism in
First Amendment doctrine of laws that have the effect of “chilling”
conduct.211 Of course, the subject and scope of protection in the
constitutional setting are meaningfully different from those under Section
230. The constitutional provision establishes, among other things, a robust
ex ante protection and affirmative defense from government “prior
restraints” on speech.212 Congress enacted the CDA, on the other hand, to
shield private online companies from ex post private law claims for the
misdeeds of private third-party actors.
But the “chilling effects” logic is nevertheless apropos. Without a
broad immunity from liability, the theory goes, online entrepreneurs may
not have as strong a native incentive to develop new applications or

209
Jones v. Dirty World, 755 F.3d 398, 408 (6th Cir. 2014); Barnes v. Yahoo, 570 F.3d 1096,
1100 (9th Cir. 2009); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 523 (Cal. 2006); Zeran v. America Online,
129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997).
210
See Jones, 755 F.3d at 408 (discussing services losing immunity for being partly responsible
for the creation or development of harmful content).
211
See, e.g., Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974) (“Faced with the penalties that
would accrue to any newspaper that published news or commentary arguably within the reach of the
right-of-access statute, editors might well conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy.”); New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266, 300 (1964) (applying chilling effects analysis to
defamation claim arising from major news paper’s publication of “matters of the highest public interest
and concern”). According to one law review article, the term “chilling effect” first appeared in a
Supreme Court opinion on a First Amendment controversy in Gibson v. Florida Legis. Investigation
Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 556–57 (1963). Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk, and the First Amendment:
Unraveling the ‘Chilling Effect,, 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 685 (1978); see also Ciolli, supra note 2, at 137,
148 (discussing the fear that over-censorship would hinder the open exchange of ideas on the internet);
Kreimer, supra note 2, at 11, 47 (discussing the fear that censorship laws for online material could
hinder free expression); Tushnet, supra note 2, at 986, 1013 (discussing the Court’s efforts to balance
the risk of harmful online speech with the risk of hindering the free exchange of information); Wu,
supra note 2, at 293, 300 (2011) (discussing the fear that imposing excessive liability for distributing
harmful speech will cause the censorship of too much content).
212
See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (describing immunity from restraints or
censorship as a long-standing liberty of the press).
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services for fear of being sued.213 Under the glare of litigious users, these
deep-pocketed companies would have to bear the responsibility of
monitoring their users’ online behavior. The social costs of such an
arrangement would be great. Service providers, whose interests do not
necessarily align with those of their users, would censor their users for fear
of being sued.214 They, moreover, would have to divert resources to
defend the parade of lawsuits arising from illegal third-party conduct. This
would be a burdensome task for most online applications, but it would be
especially onerous for companies like Reddit or YouTube that host
massive amounts of third-party user content. Fewer users would likely join
such services, diminishing the value of online engagement.
Empirically, it is hard to measure how innovative developers would be
had Congress not enacted the CDA. The best we can do perhaps is
compare online innovation in the U.S. with innovation in countries that do
not have a similar immunity provision.215 But even that would not reveal
much because, by the mid to late 1990s, internet entrepreneurs in the U.S.
had already obtained an advantageous (if not dominant) market position.
In any event, U.S. courts have eagerly drawn on the chilling effects
reasoning to articulate an extremely robust conception of Section 230
immunity.
This broad reading, however, was never inevitable. Courts in the
Anglo-American common law tradition have long concluded that
employers, hosts, and other intermediaries may be jointly, vicariously, or
secondarily liable for illegal third-party conduct, despite the burden of
having to attend to all conduct (expressive or otherwise) on their premises
or by their employees or in their publications.216 The reasons are obvious:
intermediaries are often best able to curtail the costly effects of the
underlying tort.217 We might expect for the same reason that courts would
not find it difficult to hold online intermediaries liable for hosting illegal
213
See Tushnet, supra note 2, at 987 (discussing the challenge of “[c]reating incentives and
obligations for intermediaries” without violating free expression principles).
214
Wu, supra note 2, at 300.
215
Europe’s E-Commerce Directive, for example, establishes safe harbors for civil and criminal
liability for third-party content. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the
Internal Market, 2000 O.J. L 178/1. Those protections, however, are qualified by the nature of the
intermediary and the underlying behavior. Id. at L 178/3, ¶¶ 12–14.
216
See Colleen E. Medill, The Federal Common Law of Vicarious Fiduciary Liability Under
ERISA, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 249, 254 (2011) (discussing the principal that a corporation is liable
for the conduct of its agents while they act within the scope of their employment). But see Doe v. GTE
Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 658 (7th Cir. 2003) (discussing the tendency of federal courts to refrain from
creating broad secondary liability in the absence of a specified statute).
217
See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J.
499, 500–01 (1961); see also Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CAL L. REV.
1805 (2010).
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third-party content or conduct. It would be fully consistent with a
longstanding rule that such services owe duties because of their relative
position in the political economy for distribution information.218 Such a
rule would not necessarily return us to Prodigy or the world before Section
230. Under this approach, immunity under Section 230 would only apply
to cases in which plaintiffs allege that defendants were negligent in the
efforts to take down such content.219 And, today, with as much control as
many providers have over their users’ content by moderation and design, it
would not be surprising for such a rule to take hold.
But the courts in the late 1990s chose a different path, even if
sometimes begrudgingly.220 The prevailing view was (and remains) that
the social costs of policing online content would be too great to justify
imposing liability on intermediaries for illegal third-party content.221
Courts have found the old common-law tort view to be obsolete in the era
of high-volume networked distribution of content, where the costs of
policing bad actors are prohibitively expensive. They have read the
immunity under Section 230 broadly, protecting service providers from
liability for all third-party content to which they do not materially
contribute. And this immunity is not contingent on good-faith efforts to
moderate or take down objectionable content or making filtering
technologies available to users. The guiding principle has been to ensure
that users benefit from unfettered online speech and innovation.222 The
courts have concluded that reading the immunity broadly best achieves this
end.
The courts’ role here has been significant. In the absence of clarity
from Congress, their broad reading of immunity likely accelerated the
development of no-frills services like Craigslist and Reddit that seemed to
do no more than host and publish user-generated content. By defining the
immunity in the way that they did, the courts have been
“technology-forcing,”223 directing Silicon Valley to safely develop
218

See Barnes v. Yahoo, 570 F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 2009) (discussing Hellar v. Bianco, 244
P.2d 757, 758 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952)). It is ironic that the old common law rule imposed a duty on social
hosts for the injuries caused by intoxicated guests to whom he or she has served liquor. Today, at least
in some circles, to say that an online service “hosts” content is to suggest that it does not bear
responsibility for the bad actions of its users. At least the etymology is intriguing.
219
See supra Section II.D (discussing service providers hosting illegal content being held liable if
they have a hand in creating it).
220
See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 51–52 (D.D.C. 1998) (“If it were writing on
a clean slate, this Court would agree with plaintiffs. . . . But Congress has made a different policy
choice by providing immunity even where the interactive service provider has an active, even
aggressive role in making available content prepared by others.”).
221
Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1099–1100.
222
Id.
223
See Motor Veh. Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 49 (1983) (discussing the role of
non-specific automobile safety standards in inducing the development of superior safety design).
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intermediary “Web 2.0” services that do little more than host
user-generated content. Of course, no matter how courts made sense of
Section 230, their interpretations would have determined which sorts of
applications would be winners and which would be losers in the
Information Age. But there can be little question that, in the face of
conflicting signals in the text and legislative history of the statute, the
courts helped to determine the look and feel of the market during the
crucial first decades after Congress enacted Section 230.
In the remaining Sections of this Part, below, I analyze how courts
have come to this point. In the end, I show that, by reading the statute in
the way that they have, courts have effectively turned the Good Samaritan
purposes of the statute on its head. The doctrine now immunizes service
providers who are antisocial as much if not more than those that moderate
content.224
1. The Zeran Framework
The Fourth Circuit’s 1997 opinion in Zeran v. AOL is easily the mostcited exemplar of the prevailing approach, even as the pertinent
background facts in that case look relatively quaint in light of how existing
online applications look and feel today.225 There, an anonymous AOL user
posted false advertisements for lewd merchandise that celebrated the 1995
Oklahoma City bombing on one of many America Online electronic
bulletin boards. This user then directed interested subscribers to contact an
unwitting user, plaintiff Zeran, at the latter’s phone number. After
receiving harassing calls and death threats, Zeran asked AOL to take the
false advertisements down, which AOL did. But the anonymous originator
continued to post new false advertisements over the next few days,
requiring Zeran to contact AOL each time. AOL took the advertisement
down each time, but also refused to abide by Zeran’s request that the
company issue a retraction or screen any future posts directed at him.
Zeran accordingly sued a few months later, alleging several things,
including that AOL, first, had a duty to take down all defamatory content
as soon as it had notice of it, second, should have notified all AOL
subscribers about the false nature of the advertisements, and, third, should
have blocked all future defamatory statements about Zeran.
224
David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of
Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
373, 379–80 (2010); Ann Bartow, Internet Defamation as Profit Center: The Monetization
of Online Harassment, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 383, 389–90 (2009); see also Danielle Citron,
Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L.
REV. 1435, 1439 (2011) (discussing the freedom intermediaries have in choosing whether to challenge
online speech).
225
Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997).
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The Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s decision to dismiss the
claims. Section 230, it held, shielded AOL from liability. It did not matter
that AOL had notice of the content. The statute, the panel explained,
makes no distinction between a common law distributor and publisher.226
Congress meant to protect both, as distributor liability is a subset of
publisher liability.227 Reciting the prefatory provisions of the statute, the
court explained that the purpose of the statute was to keep government
interference in the “burgeoning internet medium” to a minimum. Judicial
remedies for expressive torts, it continued, would undercut the “diversity
of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and
myriad avenues for intellectual activity” that Congress explicitly
enumerated in the findings on which the immunity is based.228 The panel
concluded, moreover, that Congress wrote the new statutory immunity to
shield the likes of AOL from liability for the “millions” of expressive acts
of third-party users that populate their service.
Ever since, federal and state courts across the country have modelled
their analysis of immunity on the Fourth Circuit’s.229 This was especially
true in the decade or so after Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson penned his opinion
in Zeran, when the technology of online information distribution did not
change much.230 Defendant services generally invoked the immunity
provision in disputes that began with a third-party user’s reputationally
injurious statements about another discrete user. The providers and users
of an interactive computer service in these early cases simply relayed other
users’ online content. The specific third-party tortfeasor’s expressive tort
and the resultant injury on the plaintiff user were the bookends of the
causal chain in these disputes.231

226

Id.
Id.
228
Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)).
229
See, e.g., Green v. America Online, 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003); Carafano v.
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003). This influence is probably an incident of
the geography of internet entrepreneurship in the United States. AOL, the largest internet service at the
end of the 1990s, was (and remains) headquartered in Northern Virginia, which is in the Fourth Circuit.
The Ninth Circuit, in which Silicon Valley sits, would also play an outsized role in defining the
doctrine.
230
See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 833 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff’d 521 U.S. 844 (1997)
(discussing origin of the internet and the prevailing way through which most users access it).
231
Notably, this framework might also include the variety of other stakeholders who always play
a constituent part in the transmission of information through and over the internet, including the
broadband access providers for each respective user. Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings LLC,
755 F.3d 398, 406 n.2 (6th Cir. 2014). But it does not necessarily include the long-haul network
operators and administrators of internet traffic, or the domain registrar from which users get their
domain names. This latter group, one way or another, contributes to the delivery of the content and
better resembles conduits than online providers of “interactive computer service” because domain
registrars generally deliver content without regard to its contents.
227
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As antiquated as an electronic bulletin board may seem to social media
users today, the main doctrinal issues have not changed much since Zeran.
In many regards, the longevity of this approach suggests that the Fourth
Circuit got it right twenty years ago. Today, courts first ask whether the
service is a “publisher” of the offending material and, second, whether and
to what extent the interactive computer service “creat[ed] or develop[ed]”
the offending content.232
The courts settled on the core of the current doctrine in the mid to late
2000s. And, as I suggest above, they were likely motivated by the chilling
effects line of argument as much as, if not more than, the plain text of
Section 230(c). They have often parroted the statute’s prefatory language
to observe that burdening services with the actionable legal duty to
monitor, block, and take down all illegal third-party material would
discourage innovation and entrepreneurship.
Congress, they have
explained, wanted the “burgeoning Internet medium” to thrive, undeterred
by the chilling threat of litigation.233 A broad reading of immunity would
best achieve these statutory purposes.234
232

The question of whether the defendant “provider or user” is “responsible, in whole or in part,”
for the objectionable content under Section 230(f)(3) is important, but mostly derivative of the second
question above about creation and development. See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v.
Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1171 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[E]ven if the data are supplied by third
parties, a website operator may still contribute to the content’s illegality and thus be liable as a
developer . . . .”). The question of who is a “user” under Section 230(c)(1) was once unclear, but has
since been resolved. The answer is: just about any entity, including natural persons, to whom a content
developer “provides” the content for distribution. See, e.g., Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 522
(Cal. 2006) (“Congress implemented its intent not by maintaining the common law distinction between
‘publishers’ and ‘distributors,’ but by broadly shielding all providers from liability for ‘publishing’
information received from third parties.”); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1038 (9th Cir. 2003)
(“Nothing in the text, legislative history, or human experience would lead me to accept the notion that
Congress in § 230 intended to immunize users or providers of interactive computer services who, by
their discretionary decisions to spread particular communications, cause trickles of defamation to swell
into rivers of harm.”).
233
Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997).
234
The courts’ treatment of Section 230(d), an often-overlooked separate duty under the statute,
also suggests that their reservations about imposing liability have likely not been particular to the text
of the statute. Section 230(d), remember, requires providers of interactive computer services to notify
new users, particularly parents of young children, about existing filtering software. Courts have said
little to nothing about the provision and, to the extent they have said anything, they have not been
inclined to enforce the obligation on providers that fail to inform their new users about filters. In 2013,
for example, a Kentucky district court read Section 230(d) to mean that website operators would not
receive immunity if they do not make attempts to screen third-party content and instead “invite
invidious postings, elaborate on them with comments of their own, and call upon others to respond in
kind.” Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 965 F. Supp. 2d 818, 822 (E.D. Ky. 2013), rev’d
755 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2014). The Sixth Circuit has rejected this “encouragement theory.” Id. at 413–
15 (reversing and vacating the district court’s decision). In 2008, a federal district court in Utah found
that a state law requiring internet service providers to provide filtering software (which they could do
by “simply referring consumers to a third-party that provides filtering software when such software is
requested”) was not inconsistent with Section 230(d). Kings English, Inc. v. Shurtleff, No. 2:05-CV-
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On the basis of this reasoning, in the decisive first several years after
Congress enacted the statute, courts had no trouble shielding providers or
users of interactive computer services from liability.235 Companies like
America Online were the clear beneficiaries in cases brought by
individuals and companies for reputation-damaging third-party content.236
In Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and Company v. America Online, for example,
plaintiff sought monetary and injunctive relief for the web portal’s
publication of incorrect stock price and share volume information about
plaintiff.237 It alleged that AOL was liable for defamation and negligence
because it had a hand in creating or developing the stock information and
routinely revised or removed information about companies when it learned
from the third-party stock information providers about errors.238 The Tenth
Circuit rejected plaintiff’s claim, explaining that communications with the
third-party content providers did not constitute development or creation
under Section 230 and, in any case, by deleting incorrect information, AOL
was “engaging in the editorial functions Congress sought to protect.” 239
The court relied heavily on Zeran to support its conclusion.
The Section 230 defense also reached well beyond web portals like
AOL in this early period. Smaller web-based providers and individual
users also successfully claimed protection under the statute.240 In Batzel v.
Smith, an art collector brought defamation and related reputational injury
claims against a relatively small website and listserv administrator for
posting third-party allegations about her ownership of Nazi art.241 In
485, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60699, at *10–14 (D. Utah Aug. 8, 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Courts may have had little to say about that provision because Congress did not specify the
sanction that courts may impose on providers that fail to adhere to its terms. And, yet, we might also
assume that, had they been inclined to adopt a narrower conception of immunity that hewed more
closely to the text of Section 230(c), they could have made immunity contingent on fulfilling the duty
under Section 230(d).
235
See, e.g., Green v. America Online, 318 F.3d 465, 473 (3d Cir. 2003) (affirming the district
court’s finding that Section 230(c)(2) provided AOL with immunity for protecting its members from
materials it considered objectionable to its subscribers); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, and Company v. America
Online, 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Congress clearly enacted § 230 to forbid the imposition
of publisher liability on a service provider for the exercise of its editorial and self-regulatory
functions.”); Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 50 (D.D.C. 1998) (“Section 230 was enacted, in
part, to maintain the robust nature of Internet communication and, accordingly, to keep government
interference in the medium to a minimum.”).
236
See, e.g., Green, 318 F.3d at 473; Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 986; Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp at 50.
237
Ben Ezra, 206 F.3d at 983.
238
Id. at 983, 985.
239
Id. at 986 (discussing Zeran).
240
See, e.g., Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 520 (Cal. 2006) (“Thus, lawsuits seeking to hold
a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as
deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred.”); Batzel v. Smith, 333
F.3d 1018, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[R]eject[ing] the argument that Mosler’s continued sponsorship of
the Network after Cremers published Smith’s statements should give rise to liability.”).
241
See infra Section III.B.2 (discussing Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1018).
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Barrett v. Rosenthal, a case decided by the California Supreme Court,
doctors brought a defamation claim against the user of a consumer
protection discussion group for impugning their character and
competence.242 The courts in both cases relied on Section 230 to dismiss
plaintiffs’ respective claims, explaining in both that the decision to post or
not to post another user’s content was an act of publishing within the
meaning of the statute.243 It did not matter that the defendants in each were
users rather than providers of an interactive computer service.
The preponderance of these early cases involved discrete third-party
posts of scandalous material about a discrete plaintiff user.244 But many
did not. Defendants invoked the immunity against claims for fraud and
unjust enrichment,245 business-related torts,246 and breach of contract.247
For the most part, however, the courts stayed true to the broad Zeran
reading of Section 230 immunity. Their interpretation accordingly has
facilitated the proliferation of online applications that depend on
user-generated content: from social media to massively multiplayer online
games to crowd-sourced review sites.248
2. Material Contribution
The cases that courts have been asked to resolve in recent years
242

Barrett, 146 P.3d at 529.
Id.; Batzel, 333 F.3d. at 1036. But see Maxfield v. Maxfield, No. FSTCV145014267, 2015
WL 9809777, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2015) (finding that defendant is not “publisher or
speaker” when retweeting defamatory material about ex-husband).
244
See generally CTR. ON LAW AND INFO. POLICY AT FORDHAM LAW SCH., SECTION 230 OF THE
COMMUNICATIONS DECENT ACT: A SURVEY OF THE LEGAL LITERATURE AND REFORM PROPOSALS
(Apr. 25, 2012) (surveying sixteen years of Section 230 cases).
245
See, e.g., Ramey v. Darkside Prods., Inc., No. 02-730 (GK), 2004 WL 5550485, at *1 (D.D.C.
May 17, 2004) (granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in case involving nude dancer’s
claims for fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, unjust enrichment, and negligence for
using intimate photos on a pornography website without consent).
246
See, e.g., Mail Abuse Prevention Sys. LLC v. Black Ice Software, Inc., No. CV788630, 2000
WL 34016435, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 13, 2000) (service provider claiming for, inter alia,
intentional interference with contractual relationships, unfair competition, and restraint of trade for
flagging plaintiffs’ emails as spam).
247
Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 38–39 (Wash. App. Div. 1 2001) (author bringing
breach of contract claim for failing to remove negative customer reviews of book).
248
See, e.g., Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1266 (9th Cir. 2016) (affirming district court’s
granting of Yelp!’s motion to dismiss given Congress’ recognition that internet activity flourishes with
minimal government regulation); Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1355 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(affirming district court’s finding that the Communications Decency Act of 1996 shields Zuckerberg
and Facebook from suit); Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 552 (N.C. App. 2012) (reversing trial
court’s decision and holding that online ticket reseller is immune from liability for allowing users to
resell tickets in its online marketplace even if the user’s actions violated the state’s anti-scalping
statute). But see Hassell v. Bird, 247 Cal. App. 4th 1336, 1341 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016), granting review,
381 P.3d 231 (2016) (affirming trial court injunction on non-party crowd sourced review site to remove
negative reviews of plaintiff).
243
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continue to present familiar fact-patterns involving discrete,
reputation-damaging third-party statements.249 But many arise from
disputes that diverge from the Zeran framework. Indeed, by the
mid-2000s, defendant providers were no longer simple conduits of the
AOL variety. They were now designing social networking applications for
dating and socializing as well as crowdsourced applications for knowledge
production,250 financing,251 user reviews,252 and traffic monitoring.253
Section 230 doctrine likely helped to fuel this expansion. That is, while
the drafters of Section 230 could not have anticipated these emergent
applications or services, they surely heralded their possibility.
Entrepreneurs, in turn, raced to design and market lucrative services,
free from the chilling threat of secondary liability. We can assume that
there was very little that was malevolent in this ambition. The driving
ethos for many of these entrepreneurs was to facilitate connections around
the world.254
But the contours of the Section 230 doctrine would have to adapt.
Courts would have to recalibrate the Zeran framework to attend to
immersive and affecting applications that neither Congress nor the Fourth
Circuit could anticipate. The specific question of how to gauge the extent
of provider creation and development would become more complicated as
developers designed applications that automated user-to-user interactions,
effectively requiring courts to revise the way in which they conceived of
the online “publisher or speaker” role.
One of the more instructive cases to take up the challenge was Fair
Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com.255 That case
concerned an ostensibly well-meaning, web-based service that matched
people looking for a place to live with people offering rooms to rent.256
The defendant’s website consisted of two pertinent features that created a
great opportunity for the Ninth Circuit to spell out how far courts would be
willing to allow the immunity under Section 230 to reach.
249

See, e.g., Huon v. Denton, 841 F.3d 733, 741 (7th Cir. 2016).
Wikipedia.com is an example of this.
251
Artistshare.com, Indiegogo.com, and Kickstarter.com are examples of crowdsourced
applications for financing.
252
Yelp.com is such a website.
253
Waze.com is an example of a crowdsourced application for traffic monitoring.
254
See Mark Zuckerberg, Is Connectivity a Human Right?, https://scontent.fijd1-1.fna.fbcdn.net/
v/t39.2365-6/12057105_1001874746531417_622371037_n.pdf?oh=ee304c17ab2509f1a5ba969786
a8372e&oe=59EEE927 (“I’m focused on this because I believe it is one of the greatest challenges of
our generation. The unfair economic reality is that those already on Facebook have way more money
than the rest of the world combined, so it may not actually be profitable for us to serve the next few
billion people for a very long time, if ever. But we believe everyone deserves to be connected.”).
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521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
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Roommates.com still exists. But since the case, the website operates a little differently than it
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In order to subscribe to the service as either a room-hunter or offeror,
Roommates required users to create a profile by choosing from a closed
universe of biographical facts, including sex, sexual orientation, and
whether the user has children.257
The service similarly required
prospective subscribers to convey which of these attributes—sex, sexual
orientation, and having children—they prefer in roommates.258
Roommates would use these preferences to classify, filter, and pair
subscribers. Second, the service invited subscribers to provide “Additional
Comments,” without any direction about what those comments convey.259
Users, as it turned out, used this space in their profile to express
preferences about prospective roommates’ gender, race, sexual orientation,
and family status.
Plaintiff, a civil rights group, sued alleging that the Roommates service
consisted of explicitly eliciting and communicating information about
prospective renters and lessors in violation of federal and state fair housing
law.260 The federal FHA flatly bars real estate brokers from eliciting
information about a prospective renter or buyer’s sex, sexual orientation, or
family status or indicating a preference for renters or buyers along any of
those dimensions.261 The fair housing advocates that brought the case
argued that, by conditioning participation in the service on reporting
restricted information, Roommates is an information content developer
within the meaning of the statute, not a passive conduit.262
The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, agreed.263 As alleged by plaintiff,
Roommates’ classifications, filtering, and matching functions, the panel
concluded, were not immune from liability because Defendant steered
subscribers based on attributes that are forbidden by federal and state fair
housing laws.264 To be sure, third-party subscribers selected among the
listed preferences and, when they did so, were “[ ]other content
developers” within the meaning of Section 230.265 The court explains that
this, however, did not preclude Roommates from being one as well.266
257

Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 1161.
Id.
259
Id.
260
Id. at 1162.
261
42 U.S.C. § 3604(c).
262
Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 1166.
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Id. at 1165.
264
Id. at 1169.
265
Id. at 1165.
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Id. at 1165, 1167 (“[T]he party responsible for putting information online may be subject to
liability, even if the information originated with a user. . . . At the same time, reading the exception for
co-developers as applying only to content that originates entirely with the website . . . ignores the
words ‘development . . . in part’ in the statutory passage ‘creation or development in whole or in part.’”
(citing Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1033 and quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3))).
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Indeed, these third-party room hunters would not have violated fair
housing law but for Roommate.com’s design.
The court was forgiving of the “Additional Comments” feature of the
website. Roommates did not contribute any part of what third-party users
posted. The “Additional Comments” feature, the court concluded, was
precisely the sort of user-generated content that Congress sought to
encourage with Section 230.267 Imposing a duty on services like
Roommates to police those comments would impose the very burden that
Congress meant to avoid. In the end, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case
back to the trial court to determine whether the drop-down menus that
Roommates employed to elicit illegal information in fact violated federal
and state housing laws.268 The Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the two
markedly different features of the rooming service delimits how far service
providers may go before losing immunity under the statute.
Roommates is today one of the most cited authorities for the material
contribution standard under Section 230. This is chiefly because the court
went beyond the Zeran framework in its immunity analysis. It did not
confine itself to the question of whether the defendant provider developed
objectionable content that originates with a discrete, reputation-damaging
post by a third party.269 The court in Roommates held that the immunity
may apply in the absence of a discrete harm to plaintiff.270
Based on this approach, search engines are immune from liability
when they index websites that make unauthorized ringtones available to
users;271 consumer advocacy websites are immune from liability for
soliciting, advertising, and claiming exclusive copyright ownership of

267

Id. at 1174.
Id. at 1175. On remand, the district court found that Roommates.com did not violate fair
housing laws. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, 666 F.3d 1216, 1219
(9th Cir. 2012).
269
Some federal courts have entertained a less demanding “encouragement test.” See, e.g., Doe v.
Sexsearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 727 (N.D. Ohio 2007), aff’d on other grounds, 551 F.3d 412, 420
(6th Cir. 2008) (“[The Court should ask] whether the claim is directed toward the defendant in its
publishing, editorial, and/or screening capacities, and seeking to hold it ‘liable for its publication of
third-party content or harms flowing from the dissemination of that content.’”). But the prevailing rule
requires plaintiffs to allege or prove that the defendant materially contributed the essential elements of
the illicit content. Jones v. Dirty World, 755 F.3d 398, 410 (6th Cir. 2014). The Sixth Circuit has
explained that the encouragement test would chill sites from entertaining user reviews or comments.
Id. at 414–15. Congress, the Sixth Circuit explained, envisioned a far more “uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open internet” than the encouragement rule would allow. Id. at 415.
270
Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 1174.
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See Manchanda v. Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft Bing, 16 CV-3350, 2016 WL 6806250 at *2,
*7 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“Manchanda has not shown that Defendants’ allegedly injurious conduct here—
namely, their aggregation and indexing of websites in their capacity as search engines—satisfies this
high standard of outrageousness.”); Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1199 (N.D. Cal.
2009) (finding Google’s use of its AdWords program acceptable under the immunity principle).
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negative reviews of attorneys;272 and employers are immune for the
defamatory statements that their employees post.273 In all of these
instances, the courts have employed a generous protection from liability
that requires plaintiffs to establish that the defendant intermediary
materially contributed to the creation or development of illegal or illicit
material.
The Roommates opinion, however, also opened the door to liability for
intermediary design. It held, after all, that immunity may be inapplicable
when the defendant provider violates a law by virtue of its design,
unrelated to whether plaintiff has experienced a discrete injury.274 It was
enough that the plaintiff civil rights organization stood in for the public to
articulate the injury under the fair housing laws. We have yet to see how
far this aspect of the holding will go. I will return to this below, in Parts III
and IV.
Indeed, the protection under Section 230 remains robust. But all is not
lost to plaintiffs. As protective of intermediaries as courts have been, they
also have held that duties to users (and all others) remain if they do not
arise from the “publishing” event, but rather from some separate or
intervening condition.275 So, an unfulfilled promise from Yahoo to take
down defamatory third-party posts creates the duty to do so if the promisee
relied on Yahoo’s representations.276 Model Mayhem, a company that
administers an online marketplace for models to advertise themselves to
agencies and advertising firms, is not immune from liability for failing to
warn users about two men it knows have used its website to lure women to
offline locations where the men sexually assault them.277 Airbnb does not
have a Section 230 defense and may be liable for failing to verify that hosts
have registered with San Francisco as lessors of their short-term rental
units.278 A marketing network that places clients’ advertisements on
affiliated “fake news” sites was not immune for publishing the deceptive
product information in the advertisements.279 Google is not immune under
272

See Small Justice LLC v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, 99 F. Supp. 3d 190, 200 (D. Mass. 2015)
(finding Xcentric Ventures LLC’s activities to be in accordance with the immunity principle).
273
Davis v. Motiva Enterprises, L.L.C., No. 09-14-00434-CV, 2015 WL 1535694, at *1–2, *5
(Tex. App. Apr. 2, 2015), appellate review denied (June 19, 2015).
274
Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 1174–75.
275
See, e.g., Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he CDA does
not provide a general immunity against all claims derived from third-party content.”); Barnes v. Yahoo,
570 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009) (indicating that there are some actions that the statute does not
shield from immunity); Airbnb v. City & County of San Francisco, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1075 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 8, 2016) (“Requirements that might have an incidental ripple effect on Internet postings are
not barred under the CDA.”).
276
Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1105.
277
Internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 853–54.
278
Airbnb, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1070, 1076.
279
Leadclick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d at 168.
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Section 230 from District of Columbia consumer protection statutory
claims because it removed the video in violation of its own terms of
service.280
There is nothing particularly remarkable in this nuance, however. The
only notable take-away from this emergent line of cases is that courts
appear to be becoming far more attentive to the way in which plaintiffs
seek remedies for the “publishing” event. The broad scope of protection
from liability for bad acts that originate with third-party users is
unchanged.
3. Whither the Good Samaritan
Courts rarely if ever draw on the biblical parable for which Section
230(c) immunity is conspicuously named. This is not that surprising,
since, alone, a statute’s heading is generally not dispositive, particularly if
courts believe that it conflicts with the gist of the statutory text.281 Nor,
moreover, are religion or religious teachings supposed to supplant the hard
work of statutory interpretation in our constitutional democracy.282 Yet, a
statute’s title or headers may be useful when the meaning of a statutory
provision is not clear,283 because they “supply cues” about the legislature’s
intentions.284 Accordingly, I offer here a word about the biblical reference.
The main scriptural account starts with a man that has been robbed,
beaten, and left for dead on the side of a major commercial road.285 Two
passersby, a priest and a Levite, walk by in turn.286 They each see the
victim on the verge of dying but do nothing to help, consistent with
interpretations of religious law that forbid defiling a corpse and avoiding
uncleanliness.287 A third passerby, a Samaritan, tends to the man’s
wounds, carries him on his donkey to a nearby inn, and pays the innkeeper
for every day that the victim stays to recover.288
On its plain terms, the parable is jarringly dissonant with life online
today, where service providers host misogynist attacks on celebrities and
mendaciously defamatory tweets from the President of the United States.
But if the caption and language of Section 230(c)(2)(A) is to be taken
280

Song Fi Inc. v. Google, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 876, 884 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1083 (2015).
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But see Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 469–70 (1892).
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Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 233 (1998) (“‘[T]he title of a statute and
the heading of a section’ are ‘tools available for the resolution of a doubt’ about the meaning of a
statute.” (quoting Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528–29 (1947))); see also
Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1083 (“While these headings are not commanding, they supply cues.”); Holy
Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 463 (“[Light is thrown upon the statute by the language of the title.”).
284
Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1083.
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Luke 10:25–37.
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GEZA VERMES, THE AUTHENTIC GOSPEL OF JESUS 152–54 (2004).
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seriously, Congress sought to entreat people to attend to vulnerable online
users in spite of popular injunctions against doing so.289
It is beyond dispute that today’s online intermediary immunity doctrine
does not encourage providers or users of interactive computer services to
follow in the footsteps of our biblical hero. Section 230 has been invoked
successfully by extremely unsympathetic defendants.290 In light of
monitoring costs, moreover, service providers have every incentive to be
agnostic about the harmful effects that their users’ communications may
have on others, including and especially the most vulnerable and
disempowered.
Putting aside the interesting question of whether governments are or
should be in the business of inspiring good works,291 after two decades of
litigation, the courts have developed an immunity doctrine that turns the
statute’s titular objective upside down. They have held that Section 230’s
reach is not confined to reputational harms or content that is harmful to
children,292 the only categories of conduct to which the statute refers. The
consensus rule today is that Section 230(c) immunizes all providers from
liability for all tortious third-party user content to the extent they do not
materially contribute to its creation or development.
More to the point, the courts have held that the immunity is not
contingent on monitoring or voluntarily taking good-faith steps to screen or
take down illicit content as the statute suggests. If it were, the courts have
explained, the doctrine would divert resources to policing content and
away from the development of new services. Instead, some courts have
explained that Section 230(c)(2)(A) provides an alternative protection for
service providers who take good-faith steps voluntarily to screen or remove
objectionable content.293 That protection is distinct from the broader
289

DOUGLAS A. HICKS & MARK VALERI, GLOBAL NEIGHBORS: CHRISTIAN FAITH AND MORAL
OBLIGATION IN TODAY’S ECONOMY 31 (2008) (quoting Martin Luther King, Jr., A Time to Break
Silence, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR. 231 (James M. Washington ed., 1991)).
290
See, e.g., Jones v. Dirty World, 755 F.3d 398, 417 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding website that enables
users to anonymously post comments, photographs, and videos immune from liability under Section
230); Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 16, 18, 24 (1st Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 622
(2017) (finding website that provides online classified advertising immune under Section 230).
291
Tax law presents this question quite directly.
292
But see Sherman v. Yahoo! Inc., 997 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1137–38 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (“[T]he
Court concludes that the ‘good samaritan’ immunity is inapplicable where Yahoo! did not engage in
any form of content analysis of the subject text to identify material that was offensive or harmful prior
to the automatic sending of a notification message.”).
293
See Barnes v. Yahoo, 570 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that Section 230(c)(2)
“provides an additional shield from liability” for services that take good step measures to remove or
restrict access to objectionable content). See, e.g., Motiva Enterprises, No. 09-14-00434-CV, 2015 WL
1535694 at *2 (explaining that Section 230(c)(2) shields defendant-employer from liability for goodfaith efforts to restrict employee-users from posting defamatory material online); Doe v. MySpace, Inc.,
474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 850 (W.D. Tex. 2007), aff’d, 528 F.3d 413, 422 (5th Cir. 2008) (explaining that
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protection under Section 230(c)(1), which covers all providers that act as a
“publisher or speaker,” as long as they do not have a hand in “creating or
developing” the objectionable content.294
This is to say that courts do not read Section 230(c) as doing what its
title purports. In a rich irony, the statute now protects the apathetic service
provider as much as the do-gooder, which is to say there is no incentive in
law to be a Good Samaritan service provider. To invoke the language of
economics, the doctrine has introduced “moral hazard.”295
As I suggest in Part II above,296 this broad protection is not the most
straightforward way of making sense of Section 230(c), particularly in
light of the teachings of the parable on which the title is based. But, with
only a few notable exceptions, the courts have been uninterested in the
point. The Zeran panel, for example, did not identify which provision of
Section 230—(c)(1) or (c)(2)(A)—it relied on to reach its conclusion. This
is not to say that it did not consider alternative forms of the immunity. The
court there recognized that Congress sought to encourage self-regulation, a
purpose that speaks directly to Section 230(c)(2)(A), and not necessarily
Section 230(c)(1). But the court did so without explicit reference to those
provisions. And it also drew a different conclusion: that the best way to
encourage self-regulation was to immunize providers that are slow or even
indifferent to user injury. Even more, other courts have written out the
distinction between active and passive users of “an interactive computer
service” under the statute, effectively equating those services that “actively
post or republish information” and those that remove or simply do not
publish objectionable content.297
But there was another way. Read closely, Section 230(c)(2)(A), as
specific and relatively conditional as it is, resembles an operative
provision, where Section 230(c)(1) blankly speaks of how to “treat”
“publisher[s] or speaker[s],” without specific mention of the circumstances

Section 230(c)(2) protects service provider from any claims “seek[ing] to hold MySpace liable for
ineffective security measures and/or policies relating to age verification”).
294
Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1105, 1107.
295
Mary Anne Franks, Moral Hazard on Stilts, LAW.COM (Nov. 10, 2017),
https://www.law.com/therecorder/sites/therecorder/2017/11/10/moral-hazard-on-stilts-zerans-legacy/
(“[T]here is no evidence that broad immunity from liability has done anything more than encourage
websites and ISPs to be increasingly reckless with regard to abusive and unlawful content on their
platforms.”)
296
See supra Section II.C.2 (discussing what constitutes creation and development under Section
230(f)(3)).
297
See Barrett v. Rosenthal, 146 P.3d 510, 527–28 (“A user who actively selects and posts
material based on its content fits well within the traditional role of ‘publisher.’”); Batzel v. Smith, 333
F.3d 1018, 1032 (9th Cir. 2003) (“The scope of the immunity cannot turn on whether the publisher
approaches the selection process as one of inclusion or removal, as the difference is one of method or
degree, not substance.”).
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under which such an entity may be immune from liability.298 Read in this
way, Section (c)(1) only delimits the category of covered “providers or
users of an interactive computer service.” Section 230(c)(2)(A), on the
other hand, is not so sweeping. It, rather, declares the conditions under
which courts may not hold a Good Samaritan service provider liable,
effectively encouraging such providers to take good-faith actions
voluntarily to screen objectionable content. This reading of Section 230(c)
would only apply the immunity when safe harbor conditions under
(c)(2)(A) are met in the way that the title of Section 230(c) and parts of the
legislative history suggest.299 The canon of interpretation that privileges
specific provisions over general ones supports this common-sense
approach.300
Some courts have acknowledged that this is a plausible reading, but
nevertheless declined to abide by it.301 Thus, today, the practical effect of
the current doctrine is to dissuade services from helping to protect users
from attack. There is now nothing to be gained under law for application
developers to be Good Samaritans online.
III. DESIGNS BEYOND IMMUNITY
I have shown above in Part II that, while courts have not completely
foreclosed relief to plaintiffs, current doctrine substantially limits the
parties from which they may recover. A plaintiff must establish that the
defendant’s service or application “materially contributes” to third-party
users’ volitional online conduct. In practice, the doctrine makes legal
challenges to intermediaries’ designs especially difficult to win.
Recent developments, however, suggest that the tide may be turning.
Popular intermediaries today do not resemble the publishers that Congress
envisioned when it enacted Section 230. As I explained in Part I above,
the most popular intermediaries today engineer almost every aspect of
users’ online experience. Courts may in this regard no longer presume that
the underlying injury originates with a third-party user’s objectionable
volitional act. They may come to recognize that service providers’ design
298

Cf. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2003) (explaining that there are multiple
ways to read Section 230(c)(1)) (Easterbrook, J.).
299
Accord Sherman v. Yahoo, 997 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1137 (S.D. Cal. 2014).
300
See, e.g., Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222, 228 (1957)
(explaining that “[s]pecific terms [in a statute] prevail over general” terms in a conflicting statute);
Dodson v. Potomac Mack Sales & Service, 400 S.E.2d 178, 181 (Va. 1991) (explaining that when
general and specific terms conflict, the latter prevails).
301
GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 660; see also Barnes v. Yahoo, 570 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009)
(“[I]f section (c) did provide equal protection, then ‘[internet service providers] may be expected to
take the do-nothing option and enjoy immunity’ because ‘precautions are costly.’” (citing GTE Corp.,
347 F.3d at 660)).
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of the choice architecture precipitate illegal expressive acts. The
Roommates formulation in particular opens up the possibility that courts
will attend to the design conditions under which illicit conduct may occur.
A. Structuring User Content
As I explained above, Roommates is the leading case on the material
contribution standard. But the Ninth Circuit’s opinion there also sheds
light on whether and how a developer’s application design might be so
affecting or assertive as to count as “development” under Section 230. The
en banc court there held that Roommates could not be immune for illegal
third-party content that it elicited.302
Its designers structured the
Roommates website to require subscribers to express preferences for
gender, sexual orientation, and family size in violation of fair housing
laws.303 Users had no hand in selecting those listed items. 304 They had to
choose among those options in order to subscribe.305 The Ninth Circuit
held that this feature of the website implicated Roommates in FHA
violations every time someone used it to find a roommate.306 The court
held that the open “Additional Comments” online form, on the other hand,
did not consign user responses in the same way and, therefore, did not
implicate Roommates in the development of third-party user content.307
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Roommates relied heavily on Carafano,
decided five years before. That older opinion helps to explain the
“material contribution” test and elaborates the later opinion’s application to
intermediary design.308 There, an anonymous user created a false profile of
the plaintiff on Matchmaker.com, a dating site operated by Metrosplash.
Matchmaker required its participating members to reveal personal
information through a questionnaire that contained over 50 multiple-choice
questions and several open-ended questions.309 The multiple-choice
questions asked for such things as users’ respective age, physical
characteristics, interests, personality, and reasons for joining the service.310
The open-ended questions invited users to submit whatever information or
photos they thought were relevant to finding a mate, as long as it did not
include risqué images or personally identifiable information like last name,
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Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1172, 1175
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home or email address, or phone number.311 Matchmaker did not review
each profile to ensure compliance.312
As in Zeran, nothing on the Matchmaker site could altogether bar
anonymous users from impersonating someone else. That is how, in
Carafano, an anonymous user based in Berlin created a false profile of the
plaintiff, a relatively well-known California-based movie and television
actress.313 While he did not identify Carafano by her real or stage name, he
still managed to suggest her identity by posting publicly available pictures
and identifying two popular movies in which she was featured.314 His
answers to the multiple-choice questions were sexually descriptive and
aggressive.315 He also included an email address through which he set up
an automatic reply that identified Carafano’s real home address and phone
number.316
Within days, Carafano was receiving phone calls, voice messages,
email, mail, and faxes.317 Several of the people who contacted her
expressed concern that she might post such a profile online.318 Most
others, however, expressed genuine interest in meeting.319 A few other
messages were sexually explicit.320 And a handful threatened physical
harm to Carafano and her son.321 The Matchmaker administrators deleted
the false profiles days after Carafano’s publicist contacted them.322 But, of
course, the damage had already been done. Carafano soon sued against
Metrosplash, alleging invasion of privacy, misappropriation of the right of
publicity, defamation, and negligence.323
The Ninth Circuit held that Matchmaker could not be held liable for
the false Carafano profile because, even if the questionnaire elicited some
of the illegal content, the anonymous third-party user, not Matchmaker,
provided the “essential published content.”324 It did not matter, the court
explained, that Matchmaker “facilitated the expression of information” or
engaged in “specific editing or selection” in defining discrete categories or
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325

sorting users’ answers.
“[T]he selection of the content was left
326
exclusively to the user.”
The Ninth Circuit did not explain what it meant by “essential,” but, as
used there, the court foreshadowed the material contribution standard that
it would later announce in Roommates.
In Carafano, the panel
acknowledged that the Matchmaker service made the illegal
communication possible but, at the same time, determined that the
company did not have a legally significant role in developing its
“essential” elements. “Matchmaker cannot be considered an ‘information
content provider’ under the statute,” the panel explained, because the
service only “structure[d] the information provided by users” in order to
match them.327
The Roommates court relied heavily on its holding in Carafano. In
that earlier case, the en banc Ninth Circuit explained, the content at issue
was “created and developed entirely by the malevolent user, without
prompting or help from the website operator.”328 In Roommates, however,
the company developed “the discriminatory questions, discriminatory
answers, and discriminatory search mechanism” before any new
subscribers even expressed their preferences.329 Roommates, moreover,
“ma[de] aggressive use” of the content that it elicits from users “in
conducting its business.”330
The difference between contributions for which an intermediary may
be liable and those for which it may not turns on how “essential” the
intermediary is to the development of the illegal online conduct.331 The
immunity under this framing is not contingent on whether a third party
provides the content. Nor does it depend on whether the provider’s
contribution is additive. After Roommates, the immunity may turn on the
way in which the intermediary structures its service or application to
receive and uses third-party material. This approach takes seriously the
statute’s assertion that service providers lose their immunity if they are
“responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of
information.”332
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B. Design as Knowledge
Missing from the discussion here (and the doctrine) has been any
serious consideration of how much a defendant provider must know about
the likelihood of harm to lose the immunity. We might understand the
Roommates opinion to suggest that a provider cannot be immune when it
has knowingly designed its service or application in order to elicit illegal
third-party content. After all, Roommates deliberately designed its site so
that all of its users had to choose between its prepopulated drop-down
menu options.333 As with most website developers, the company was
probably very attentive to the substantive preference options from which it
allowed users to choose, as well as the way it presented the choices for
selection (i.e., choice architecture).
But the Roommates court did not frame its opinion in this way. Nor
did it have to. After Zeran, subjective provider knowledge of user
wrongdoing has no part in the current doctrine.334 Two other cases help to
explain: Doe v. Myspace and Batzel v. Smith.
1. Subjective Knowledge about the Likelihood of Harm to Plaintiff
In Doe v. MySpace, the defendant provider operated (and still operates)
a social networking site that requires users to create profiles with a name,
an email address, gender, country, and date of birth.335 Users may also
post photographs, videos, and any other information that they want to share
with the public or, if they prefer, their circle of MySpace friends.336 Users
who were over age sixteen could limit which aspects of their profile could
be seen by others.337 MySpace, however, automatically rendered the
profiles of users who are under sixteen private.338 The service also
developed software to ferret out teenagers who claimed to be older than
they were, but this feature was far from foolproof since about 22 percent of
its users were minors, and a large percentage of these users claimed to be
older than they really were.339
Like many of her peers, Julie falsely represented that she was eighteen
years old when she created her MySpace profile.340 And she chose not to
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That Roommates did not include racial categories among its prepopulated drop-down menu
suggests an unstated recognition on this point. It may be that they thought that such categories would
be illegal, if not simply alarming.
334
See Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[T]his theory of liability is
merely a subset, or a species, of publisher liability, and is therefore foreclosed . . . .”).
335
Doe v. MySpace, 528 F.3d 413, 416–17 (5th Cir. 2008).
336
Id. at 415.
337
Id.
338
Id.
339
Id. at 416–17 (5th Cir. 2008).
340
Id. at 416.
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block access to her information. Her personal information was therefore
viewable by all MySpace users. It was under these conditions that Julie
and a nineteen-year old man exchanged contact information.342 The two
eventually met in person and, there, at their first encounter, the older man
sexually assaulted her.343 Soon after, Julie and her mother brought a
handful of tort claims against MySpace, including claims for negligence
and gross negligence for failing to implement basic safety measures to
protect minors from predators.344 They argued that the physical sexual
assault arose out of the connection Julie made by virtue of MySpace’s
questionnaire. The Does argued that the immunity provisions were
inapplicable because MySpace was “partially responsible for creating the
content” that brought Julie, a minor, in contact with her attacker.345
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s
dismissal of the Doe’s claims.346 The plaintiffs, the panel explained, were
suing MySpace for publishing information for which Julie was wholly
responsible.347 She had done so in spite of MySpace’s rule against such
misrepresentations. Imposing liability on MySpace for the distribution of
this content, the panel determined, was exactly what Congress wanted to
block.348
MySpace’s design was in no small part born from the broad
interpretation of Section 230 immunity that the courts had developed in the
decade before. The company curated the information that users shared
with others. And it did so knowing that over a fifth of its users were
minors and that many of these, in turn, misrepresented their age. This is to
say that the company actively courted children, knowing that many of them
would misrepresent their age.
One might assume that a statute addressed to protecting children from
objectionable online content would not immunize websites that knowingly
expose children to danger. But, for the Fifth Circuit, that consideration
hardly made an appearance in the opinion. For the panel, plaintiffs had to
be far more engaged in the underlying tort—perhaps by explicitly eliciting
an incorrect age or encouraging a sexual encounter between underage Julie
and her adult assailant.349 Without such allegations, the court determined
341

Id.
Id.
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Id.
344
Id. at 416.
345
Id. at 417.
346
Id. at 415.
347
Id. at 421.
348
See id. at 419 (“Congress made a policy choice, however, not to deter harmful online speech
through the separate route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other
parties’ potentially injurious messages.”).
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Id. at 420.
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that MySpace owed no obligation to implement any further safety
measures to bar minors from interacting with adults, even as it knew that a
meaningful number of the children who used the application were
vulnerable.
This approach is quite unlike the way in which courts analyze the
scope of liability in cases involving claims that a defendant intermediary
has generalizable or specific subjective knowledge that its service or
product facilitates copyright violations.350
Pursuant to the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, the 1998 amendment to the Copyright Act, a
provider is obliged to remove infringing material when it has “actual
knowledge” of it on its site or is “aware of facts or circumstances from
which infringing activity is apparent.”351 Under Section 230, on the other
hand, services like MySpace are shielded from liability for publishing
users’ information even though its administrators understood with a
relatively high degree of confidence that minors were misrepresenting their
ages on the site and that, by doing so, those children were making
themselves vulnerable to attack. The company’s policy of automatically
protecting the privacy of users under the age of sixteen betrays its
knowledge of the risks. But its awareness of wrongdoing was not salient
enough to sway the court against MySpace. For the panel, the social media
company owed no duty to attend to patterns of deception (on the part of
children) and abuse (on the part of adults), no matter how pernicious or
predictable.
There is at least one sliver of hope for plaintiffs set on premising their
theory of service provider liability on the provider’s subjective knowledge
of third-party wrongdoing. One year after the decision in Roommates, in
Federal Trade Commission v. Accusearch, the Tenth Circuit suggested that
a defendant-provider’s knowledge may indeed be important to
understanding the materiality of its contribution to illegal third-party

350

See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 933–34 (2005) (“The Ninth
Circuit has read Sony’s limitation to mean that whenever a product is capable of substantial lawful use,
the producer can never be held contributory liable for third parties’ infringing use of it; it read the rule
as being this broad, even when an actual purpose to cause infringing use is shown by evidence
independent of design and distribution of the product, unless the distributors had specific knowledge of
infringement at a time at which they contributed to the infringement, and failed to act upon that
information.”); Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 487 (1984)
(“Moreover, a finding of contributory infringement has never depended on actual knowledge of
particular instances of infringement; it is sufficient that the defendant have reason to know that
infringement is taking place.”); Viacom Int’l v. YouTube, 676 F.3d 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2012) (“In light of
our holding that § 512(c)(1)(B) does not include a specific knowledge requirement, we think it prudent
to remand to the District Court to consider in the first instance whether the plaintiffs have adduced
sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to conclude that YouTube had the right and ability to
control the infringing activity and received a financial benefit directly attributable to that activity.”).
351
17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (2010).
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content.
Importantly, there, the defendant’s knowledge was evidenced
by the systems it put in place to generate third-party content. In this case,
the defendant operated a website that sold personal information about
individuals, including telephone records.353 Users of Accusearch’s service
paid an “administrative search fee” to obtain public and private
information about people.354 The company, in turn, contracted with thirdparty researchers to retrieve the sought information “in accordance with
applicable law.”355 Once retrieved and formatted, Accusearch delivered
the information to the requesting customer’s online account.356 The
Federal Trade Commission sued, alleging, among other things, that
Accusearch committed an unfair trade practice under the Federal Trade
Commission Act whenever it obtained and made confidential customer
telephone records publicly available.357 Accusearch moved for summary
judgment on Section 230 grounds.358
The question for the Tenth Circuit panel was whether Accusearch
created or developed the confidential telephone information under Section
230(f)(3) by engaging researchers to retrieve it.359 The court answered that
Accusearch did and, therefore, was ineligible for immunity.360 The term
“development,” it explained, should be read to encompass “the act of
drawing something out, making it visible, active, or usable.”361 The term
“responsible” under Section 230, it continued, suggests that the provider is

352
See FTC v. Accusearch, 570 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Accusearch solicited requests
for such confidential information and then paid researchers to obtain it. It knowingly sought to
transform virtually unknown information into a publicly available commodity. And as the district court
found and the record shows, Accusearch knew that its researchers were obtaining the information
through fraud or other illegality.”).
353
Id. at 1190.
354
Id. at 1191.
355
Id.
356
Id.
357
See id. at 1192 (alleging that Accusearch’s conduct violated the FTC Act to the extent 47
U.S.C. § 222 makes consumer telephone records confidential).
358
Id. at 1192–93.
359
Id. at 1198; see also Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 50 (D.D.C. 1998) (“While
Section 230 does not preclude joint liability for the joint development of content, AOL maintains that
there simply is no evidence here that AOL had any role in creating or developing any of the
information in the Drudge Report. The Court agrees.”). The panel dispensed with the question of
whether Accusearch was a publisher within the meaning of the statute in very short order. Accusearch,
570 F. 3d at 1197. The concurring opinion was of the view that plaintiff was not challenging the
defendant for publishing, but for its “unfair” conduct. See id. at 1206 (Tymkovich, J., concurring)
(“Accusearch’s duty to refrain from engaging in these unfair business practices does not derive from its
status or conduct as an Internet website that publishes content.”).
360
Accusearch, 570 F. 3d at 1198.
361
Id. (quoting Develop, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2002)) (internal
quotations marks omitted).
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“more than a neutral conduit for . . . content.”362 Section 230 would not
allow courts to impose liability on a service provider in the same way that
a highway builder could not be responsible for a banker’s escape.363 Thus,
under the statute, the panel concluded, “a service provider is responsible
for the development of offensive content only if it in some way specifically
encourages development of what is offensive about the content.”364
This, the Tenth Circuit concluded, is what Accusearch did when it
routinely contracted with third-party researchers to retrieve customer
information it knew to be illegal. Unlike Ben Ezra, where defendant AOL
solicited information that happened to be inaccurate, Accusearch
knowingly sought to obtain confidential consumer information in order to
share it with the public.365 Accusearch’s solicitation and collection of
private customer information, the court observed, was its reason for
being.366
This, recall, was similar to Roommates’ failing. The real estate search
service there required third-party users to provide illegal responses to
illegal questions in order to participate. Connecting users based on the
restricted demographic information that Roommates elicited and sorted
was the application’s reason for being. To be sure, the (restricted)
dimensions on which Roommates relied to facilitate reliably strong
matches were salient. But that is precisely why Congress forbade their
consideration. The Ninth Circuit held that, no matter how valuable
information about a prospective roommate’s gender or sexual orientation
might be, it is illegal to traffic in it when looking for a roommate.367
Eliciting that information harms disfavored groups in exactly the ways the
fair housing laws forbid.
In this way, it may be that the potential violation in Roommates was far
worse than that in Accusearch, because, unlike the latter, every third-party
response in the former was illegal. And, more to the point here,
Roommates designed its application in order to collect and publish the
illegal information. To the extent Accusearch was implicated in the
development of illegal content, it was because the company paid
362
Id. at 1199 (quoting Responsible, WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed.
2002)) (internal quotations marks omitted).
363
Id. at 1199.
364
Id. (internal quotations omitted). In its phrasing, the panel here suggested that it may have
employed the “encouragement” test that most courts have rejected. The Accusearch panel, however,
explicitly adhered to the prevailing material contribution standard in other parts of the decision.
365
See id. at 1199. (“Accusearch knew that its researchers were obtaining the information through
fraud or other illegality.” (emphasis added)).
366
See id. at 1200 (“[T]he offensive postings were Accusearch’s raison d’etre . . . .”).
367
See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1174 (9th
Cir. 2008) (absolving Roommates from liability because it is not responsible for the content being
created by its users).
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researchers to obtain information it knew to be illegal.
But those
violations occurred only when a subscriber sought that kind of personal
information.369
2. Objective Knowledge about Third-Party User Intent
This is not to say that courts do not consider a service provider’s
knowledge of wrongdoing to determine the applicability of Section 230
immunity. The Ninth Circuit did in at least one case early in the statute’s
life. In Batzel v. Smith, the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant provider’s
knowledge was pertinent to determining whether the third party “provided”
the content at issue for publication. “Publishing,” it held, could only occur
if the provider reasonably believes that it was the third-party user’s
intention to have the material published.370 The opposite rule, the court
explained, would confer “nearly limitless immunity for speech never meant
to be broadcast over the Internet,”371 and accordingly work against Section
230’s objective to encourage providers “to remove offensive material.”372
To shield the defendant in that case from liability, the panel observed,
would have the opposite effect; it would protect providers who attribute
objectionable content to unwitting third parties.373
The third party in that case, Robert Smith, was a building contractor
who had reason to believe that one of his clients, plaintiff Ellen Batzel,
inherited paintings that had been illegally stolen by the Nazis in the years
before World War II.374 Smith sent an email message that conveyed his
suspicions to an email address that he found online for the Museum
Security Network, an online network devoted the retrieval of stolen art.375
The recipient of the email, Ton Cremers, immediately forwarded Smith’s
368

Id. at 1199.
A very recent case, FTC v. LeadClick Media, 838 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2016), falls somewhere
between Roommates and Accusearch on the dimension of pertinent provider knowledge. LeadClick
operated a marketing network that placed client-merchants’ advertisements on affiliated “fake news”
sites. Most if not all of the clients with which the company did business marketed popular weight-loss
products. It administered this line of business through software that innocuously tracked and
monetized user traffic from the affiliated site to the merchant’s site. Id. at 163–64. LeadClick’s eight
to ten employees cultivated relationships with these affiliated fake news sites and, in some cases, even
directed and edited content about the efficacy of the products. These affiliated sites falsely claimed
that, pursuant to testing, the weight loss product showed appreciable effects on consumers. See
Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1200 (“By paying its researchers to acquire telephone records, knowing that
the confidentiality of the records was protected by law, it contributed mightily to the unlawful conduct
of its researchers.”).
370
Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1034 (9th Cir. 2003).
371
Id. at 1033. Even in 2003, courts were mixing metaphors associated with different media
technologies.
372
Id. at 1034.
373
Id. at 1034.
374
Id. at 1021.
375
Id. at 1021.
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email to the Network’s affiliated listserv and also posted it on the website
after making minor edits.376 Trial discovery suggested that Smith did not
know that his email would be forwarded to the Network’s international
email address list.377
Her reputation tarnished, plaintiff sued Smith, Cremers, and others for
defamation.378 She argued that she was not related to Nazis and that the art
was not looted Nazi art.379 Cremers answered that, among other things, he
could not be held liable for posting Smiths’ defamatory statements on the
website because he is a publisher that “did no more than select and make
minor alterations to Smith’s email.”380
The panel sided with Cremers.381 And, in this regard, Batzel ratified
the emergent view then in 2003 that providers of interactive computer
services would find a generous protection under Section 230(c) to publish
illegal third-party content without concern about liability.382 But, far more
pertinently, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the trial court for more
fact-finding on whether a reasonable provider could believe that Smith
intended to the have the contents of his email message forwarded or
published to the Network’s listserv.383 This is to say that the court did not
remand the case to the district court to inquire into Cremers’ subjective
impressions of Smith’s intentions. Section 230 makes no provision for that
kind of consideration. Nor was the lower court to concern itself with
whether Cremers meant to do harm by publishing the contents of Smith’s
email. The panel’s opinion disposed of that question. Rather, the Ninth
Circuit charged the trial court with the task of determining whether,
objectively, a provider or user of an interactive computer service could
reasonably believe that Smith wanted him to publish the contents of the
email.
Since Batzel, courts do not bother to inquire into providers’ subjective
knowledge of or intention to publish illegal content. Nor, after MySpace,
does the doctrine consider intermediaries’ knowledge of the likelihood of
wrongdoing pertinent to the immunity analysis. The doctrine is simply not
concerned with providers’ subjective intentions, in spite of the language in
Section 230(c)(2) addressed to “good faith.”
The Batzel panel, however, did think it important to recognize that
intermediaries are obliged to heed the intentions of third-party users. At a
376
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minimum, this elaboration allows that an intermediary may be liable if it is
unreasonable in its assessment of whether a third-party user sought to
publish content.
Sometimes circumstances surrounding providers’
acquisition of third-party content are sufficiently unclear as to counsel
against immunity for publishing that content. This is a far cry from the
kind of subjective knowledge that courts consider in cases involving
publishing torts in other settings.384 But, in any event, this elaboration in
the doctrine offers something of an opening into provider decision-making
processes. It requires that intermediaries be reasonable in their editorial
decision to publish third-party content. They may not veer away from or
be inattentive to the expectations of their users. This elaboration could
have purchase in an online information ecosystem in which users share
information to providers that is later used by that provider in some
ancillary or unrelated secondary market. I turn to this point in the next and
final Part of the Article.
IV. DESIGN DUTIES: REIMAGINING IMMUNITY
A. Designs on Ancillary or Secondary Markets
Courts have interpreted Section 230 broadly. They do not consider the
voluntary good-faith efforts of defendant providers, in spite of the
evocative Good Samaritan language in the statute. Nor do they inquire
into providers’ subjective knowledge or control of third-party wrongdoing,
as they do under traditional intermediary-liability rules.385 Courts today
are reluctant to impose liability on online intermediaries in the name of
preserving the generative ethos of openness and innovation.
This laissez-faire approach made sense in the late 1990s and early
2000s, when service providers offered themselves as little more than the
conduits through which content flowed between users. Today, however,
the most popular intermediaries only “publish” a fraction of the
information that users “provide” in the way that those users intended.
Intermediaries instead collect, analyze, collate, and reconfigure the content
for markets from which those original users gain no material direct benefit.

384

See, e.g., Viacom Int’l v. YouTube, 679 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012).
Compare 17 U.S.C. § 512(c), Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 937 (2005)
(“Mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not be enough here to
subject a distributor to liability.”), and Sony v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984) (“If
vicarious liability is to be imposed on Sony in this case, it must rest on the fact that it has sold
equipment with constructive knowledge of the fact that its customers may use that equipment to make
unauthorized copies of copyrighted material.”), with Viacom v. YouTube, 676 F.3d 19, 41 (2d Cir.
2012) (“The District Court correctly held that 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A) requires knowledge or
awareness of facts or circumstances that indicate specific and identifiable instances of
infringement . . . .”).
385
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This must complicate the immunity analysis because the practice of
trading in user data—that is, after the analysis and sorting—does not fit
easily within the scope of Section 230. First, the behind-the-scenes “block
box” algorithmic processing on which intermediaries depend ostensibly
produces new content that they then make available to other parties in
ancillary and secondary markets. Providers like these do not resemble the
traditional conduits envisioned by the framers of Section 230. Nor do the
ways in which these intermediaries later make user data available in
ancillary or secondary markets look anything like the publishing events
envisioned in the doctrine. Nor, of course, do they involve the
communication of “objectionable” “material” as was meant by Congress in
1996.
To the extent there is anything troubling in the administration of users’
content on social media and online marketplaces, it is in the way in which
providers “publish” or, rather, repurpose and exploit users’ content. And
the current Section 230 doctrine does not allow courts to account for it.386
As I have shown here, however, application designs implicate
intermediaries in the creation and development of user content in each
instance. Some applications, like Reddit and Twitter, for example, allow
their users to use pseudonyms. This has the effect of instilling in users a
sense that no issue or topic, no matter how unlawful or objectionable, is
taboo. Others, like Amazon or Tinder, are more engaged, acting as online
concierges and curators; they make recommendations about products and
potential partners based on each users’ idiosyncratic interests and desires.
And still others, like Netflix or Facebook, sort and monetize their users’
data in ancillary or secondary markets. Indeed, intermediaries in this third
category are involved in a two-sided business: one that collects user
information by dint of their ostensible role as a conduit of communication
and another that markets user data to advertising networks and data
brokers.387 A final fourth category of intermediaries surreptitiously designs
their applications with the purpose of directing user behavior. Consider the
admittedly extreme example of Uber, the ride-hailing smartphone app, that
has surreptitiously employed a variety of deceptive techniques to
manipulate drivers and dupe regulators.388
386

See supra Part I (explaining 47 U.S.C. § 230).
See NICK SRNICEK, PLATFORM CAPITALISM (2016); see also Alan Z. Rozenshtein,
Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2935321 (“Surveillance intermediaries also sometimes enable the
government’s surveillance capabilities, whether by serving as ‘fourth-party’ data brokers that purchase,
package and resell user data, or by providing infrastructure and technology . . . .”).
388
See Mike Isaac, Uber’s C.E.O. Plays with Fire, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/23/technology/travis-kalanick-pushes-uber-and-himself-to-theprecipice.html (discussing how Uber added a “de Blasio” tab in its app to show lengthy wait times
when Mayor Bill de Blasio attempted to limit the number of Uber cars); Noam Sheiber, How Uber
387
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It is clear then that, today, the information that users share does not
necessarily flow untouched through providers’ servers, from user to user.
And it is not “published” in the way Section 230 contemplates. The
manner in which applications marshal user information varies greatly. The
most commercially successful online companies today design their services
to collect as much user information as possible. They elicit, structure, sort,
and sometimes market and sell the user data they receive. Mindful of its
value, moreover, these intermediaries employ clever techniques that keep
users coming back to give more.389 In this way, application developers
may be far more involved in generating user content and online behavior
than the Zeran framework contemplates. At best, these services only
pretend to be passive platforms that facilitate user interactions.
Many, if not most intermediaries today are more implicated than courts
believed them to be just a decade ago. In Roommates, the defendant
service there required subscribers to provide certain information to
facilitate salient user-to-user connections. The company may have had
other uses for the data it collected, but this possibility did not matter much
for the court’s purposes. (The question did not make an appearance in the
opinions below or on appeal in that case.) At most, the Ninth Circuit in
Roommates casually observed that the defendant service “ma[d]e
aggressive use of [user data] in conducting its business,” without
explaining what “aggressive use” meant.390 Today, in contrast, service
providers structure and elicit user content in far more assertive if
innocuous ways. We might wonder whether this, too, might count as
making “aggressive use” of content—that is, whether assertive designs

Uses Psychological Tricks to Push Its Drivers’ Buttons, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/04/02/technology/uber-drivers-psychological-tricks.html
(detailing how the company exploits people’s tendencies, such as the one to set earnings goals by
alerting them that they are “ever so close” to hitting a precious target when they try to log off). This is
in sharp contrast to the transparent way in which some online marketplaces own up to their obligations
to their agents and employees. See Editorial Board, The Gig Economy’s False Promise, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/opinion/the-gig-economys-false-promise.html?
nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcore-iphone-share (“Uber and other companies use tactics developed by the
video game industry to keep drivers on the road when they would prefer to call it a day, raising
company revenue while lowering drivers’ per-hour earnings.”).
389
See John Herrman, Platform Companies Are Becoming More Powerful – but What Exactly Do
They Want?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/21/magazine/platformcompanies-are-becoming-more-powerful-but-what-exactly-do-they-want.html?_r=0 (“With a rigidly
structured platform like Uber, for which the company sets prices, the economic problems are somewhat
akin to those of a command economy: How low can we push the cost of a ride before drivers stop
participating?”).
390
Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1172 (9th Cir.
2008) (emphasis added).

272

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:1

might count as “material contribution” under the doctrine.391
The immunity may also be inapplicable if the defendant intermediary
designs its service in order to profit from user content through some other
service. Thus, while Section 230 might require a court to dismiss a suit in
which plaintiff alleges that a service provider’s “Terms of Use” give the
provider an ownership interest in a third party’s content,392 the immunity
could very well be unavailable if the service designs its application in order
to collect particular kinds of illicit information that, through algorithmic
analysis and sorting, it then repurposes in an ancillary or secondary market.
In these arrangements, it is a stretch to refer to this manipulation and
exploitation of user content as “publishing” within the meaning of the
statute.
The rule in Batzel that providers attend to whether the third-party user
at issue intended to have his or her content published is helpful in puzzling
through the question. A court in the Northern District of California, for
example, rejected Facebook’s Section 230 defense in a case in which users
alleged that the social media company misappropriated their names,
likenesses, and “likes” for targeted commercial endorsements without their
consent.393 Facebook, the district court in that case explained, grouped
plaintiffs’ information with advertisers logos, “transform[ing] the character
of Plaintiffs’ words, photographs, and actions into a commercial
endorsement to which they did not consent.”394
This returns us to the example of Facebook’s advertising service.
Recall that, there, Facebook enables users to craft microtargeted
advertising campaigns to exclude or include prospective audiences on a
variety of dimensions, including by “ethnic” or “multicultural affinities.”
These categories would be uncontroversial but for federal and state laws
that prohibit the use of race or ethnicity (and proxies for those attributes) to
discriminate against buyers or sellers in the housing and employment
market. The same laws bar advertisements that discriminate on those
bases.
The pertinent question is whether Facebook is immune from liability
under Section 230 for discriminatory advertising campaigns that target or
exclude people with ethnic or multicultural affinities. There would be little
391
I do not take up here the point that the source code “controls” the development of user content.
See Opperman v. Path, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 3d 962, 972 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (detailing how Apple controls
which apps are available on the App Store).
392
See, e.g., Small Justice v. XCentric Ventures, 99 F. Supp. 3d 190, 197 (D. Mass. 2015)
(concluding that the transfer of copyright ownership is valid when the user is on inquiry notice of the
terms and conditions); Facebook v. Finkel, No. 102578, 2009 WL 3240365, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Sept. 15,
2009) (holding that the argument that Facebook’s Terms of Use grant the user an ownership interest in
the content is meritless).
393
Fraley v. Facebook, 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 802 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
394
Id. at 802–03.
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controversy on the question if, through the advertising service, Facebook
required all house- and apartment-hunters to share racial, ethnic, or gender
information about themselves or just enabled advertisers to exclude users
based on that information. In that scenario, after Roommates, Facebook
would almost certainly be subject to liability under the FHA. The social
media company would likely be even more exposed to liability if it
required its social media users to share race or ethnicity (or any
information indicating membership in a protected class) even if those users
never used the advertising service.
Facebook, however, is not so brazen. It does not require participants
on the advertising platform or through the social media application to share
prohibited information. Nor does it publish all the information it receives;
it publishes only a fraction of the user information that it collects, analyzes,
and classifies. Relying on algorithms for understanding “big data,”
Facebook sorts users on a variety of salient dimensions—by, for example,
hobby, communities of interest, and profession. This is the same process
that enables its flagship social media site to recommend new friends, curate
news and current events, and post targeted advertisements for each user.
Affinity designations are just one way of articulating the data that it
collects and analyzes.
Practically, it was inevitable that Facebook would enable advertisers to
microtarget audiences. After all, this is what effective advertisers and
marketing directors do anyway in practically all markets. Facebook’s great
advantage is that it sits atop an extraordinary trove of user data through
which it can make marketing across substantive areas more efficient and
effective than ever. A publisher of Urdu language books would not want
to reach anyone other than Pakistanis or, better, people with an affinity for
Pakistani culture. A costume designer would be right to target women
with an affinity for soca music during carnival season. A nonprofit that is
hosting a career fair for Latinos in New York City should probably target
New Yorkers with an affinity for the Dominican Republic. A merchant
who sells hair care products for black women will reasonably target those
women at the exclusion of others.395 The advertising service is just one
way of sorting pertinent user data to aid small businesses, product
managers, and individual users in practical ways.
But does Section 230 shield Facebook from liability for enabling users
or advertisers to discriminate against protected classes in markets that are
only tenuously tied to the social media service? Or, what is more, may
Facebook claim the immunity when it analyzes and clusters the data in
ways that users could not foresee or, perhaps, desire? There are several
395

See Christian Martinez, Driving Relevance and Inclusion with Multicultural Marketing,
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Oct. 28, 2016), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/h/driving-relevance-andinclusion-with-multicultural-marketing/.
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reasons to believe that the company would be protected under the statute.
First, it is not at all obvious that the ethnic or multicultural affinity
classification is an actionable proxy for race or ethnicity, as it theoretically
could include users of all racial and ethnic backgrounds. Sorting users by
affinity rather than race or ethnicity is not the same as sorting on ethnicity
or race as such. In any event, unlike the service at issue in Roommates,
Facebook’s advertising service does not require that users share prohibited
information about themselves. Nor does it require users to express
preferences for races or ethnicities. Its algorithms do the work of sorting.
Facebook leaves it to advertisers to decide the uses to which they put the
service and affinity classifications. This use-agnosticism suggests that the
service is a neutral tool for user-to-user interaction and commerce in the
way envisioned under the prevailing doctrine.
On the other hand, a fair housing or equal employment challenge to
Facebook’s advertising service could cite Roommates (and Carafano) to
argue that the ethnic or multicultural affinity designations make the
violation of civil rights laws possible. The company materially contributes
to discriminatory online conduct because the Facebook-created affinity
classifications are essential to actualizing illegal online conduct.396 The
company’s design implicates it in all discriminatory advertising
campaigns. Under this theory, Facebook would be subject to what I have
called above design liability, in contrast to publisher or distributor
liability.397
That the company collects and synthesizes non-racial or non-ethnic
user data to create “ethnic” or “multicultural affinity” classifications does
not necessarily justify the immunity. To the contrary, Facebook’s use of
big data algorithmic analysis of ostensibly non-racial data is precisely the
396
See Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.
2008); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).
397
See supra Section IV.A. Framed in this way, we might think that prevailing norms in the law
of product liability might have something to teach. I do not offer here any meaningful comparison.
One worthwhile consideration here is how or even whether the manufacturer of a defective product is
legally implicated in an injury to a plaintiff by a third party’s illegal use of the defective product.
Public law immunity for gun manufacturers comes to mind. See Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms
International, FBTCV 156048103S, 2016 WL 8115354, at * 23 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 14, 2016)
(applying immunity under Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7901-7903). This
is in contrast to the affirmative duty of web developers to accommodate all users of their online service
under the Americans with Disabilities Act. See Nat’l Fed. of the Blind v. Target Corp., 452 F. Supp. 2d
946, 956 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (rejecting defendant’s argument that access to public accommodation is
limited to physical access). Some courts have found online services to be outside of the scope of the
ADA. E.g., Earll v. eBay, Inc., 599 Fed. Appx. 695, 696 (9th Cir. 2015); Young v. Facebook, Inc., 790
F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118–19 (N.D. Cal 2011); Oullette v. Viacom, No. CV 10–133–M–DWM–JCL,
2011 WL 1882780, at *7 (M.D. Mont. Mar. 31, 2011). Others have not. E.g., Nat’l Fed. of the Blind
v. Scribd., 162 F. Supp. 3d 565, 576 (D. Vt. 2015); Nat’l Ass’n of the Deaf v. Netflix, Inc., 869 F.
Supp. 2d 196, 208 (D. Mass. 2012).
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sort of thing on which we would expect bigots to rely to mask their true
intentions. Facebook also collects user data through its flagship social
media application that it, in turn, exploits in the ancillary advertising
service. The company’s contribution to the unlawful online discriminatory
conduct is material—indeed, indispensable—because, through the power
of its algorithmic processing, it creates commercially salient classifications
that were indiscernible before the intervention. What is more, the purposes
to which user content are put are arguably unrelated to the services to
which users volunteer their information in the first instance. To put this in
the terms of the doctrine, it might be unreasonable for Facebook to expect
users to provide personal information about themselves (including data that
is not intuitively racial or ethnic) that could later be used to discriminate
against them or others on the basis of race or proxies for race.398
B. Public Duties
There is at least one other consideration that counsels against
immunizing Facebook for discriminatory advertising campaigns that
violate the FHA. As Roommates and Accusearch illustrate, plaintiffs who
are not directly injured by a discrete volitional act by a third-party user
may still overcome Section 230 to the extent that the defendant service
creates or develops prohibited content by design. This feature in the
doctrine enables parties to stand in as a representative of the public. Thus,
Roommates could not claim the immunity because it elicited and published
FHA-prohibited content.
Accusearch was not immune because it
contracted with researchers to violate consumer privacy laws. In both
cases, the injury was not to a discrete party as much as to the public in
general. These were cases in which defendant services engaged in what
Jack Balkin has called “algorithmic nuisance[s],” the “socially unjustified
use of computational capacities that externalizes costs onto innocent
others.”399 Thus, in both cases, plaintiffs—a civil rights organization and a
federal agency—stood in on behalf of the public.
Generally, as I show at the end of Section II.D above, the immunity
does not shield services from liability for violating a duty that they owe to
their individual users.400 But services also are not entitled to protection
398
Compare Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1032 (9th Cir. 2003) (involving a user who provided
his email without intending for the email to be publicly available), with Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F.
Supp. 2d 785, 802 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (addressing a plaintiff who claimed Facebook “creates content by
deceptively mistranslating members’ actions”).
399
Jack M. Balkin, The Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J.
(forthcoming 2017).
400
See supra Part II (discussing Barnes v. Yahoo); see also Goddard v. Google, 640 F. Supp. 2d
1193, 1200 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (immunity does not apply to “conduct giving rise to an independent and
enforceable contractual obligation”); Universal Communications Systems v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413,
419 (1st Cir. 2007) (‘‘[A]n interactive computer service provider remains liable for its own speech.’’).
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from liability under Section 230 when they engage in conduct that is
against manifest public law. Thus, the courts in Roommates and
Accusearch rejected the immunity for the defendant services in those cases
because the defendants violated public law on housing discrimination and
unfair trade practices.401
In some regards, the opinions in those cases just restated Section 230’s
plain terms that services are not immune from liability for creating or
developing illegal content “in whole or in part.”402 But the nature of the
legal duties that gave rise to potential liability in those cases moved them
out of the Zeran framework (i.e., injury to plaintiff arising from a discrete
volitional act by a third-party user) because plaintiffs’ claims in those cases
arose from the obligations the defendants owed by virtue of public law.
The complaining parties in these cases were a civil rights organization and
a government agency.403 Plaintiffs could have been any party that could
stand in for the public.404 Thus, based on this idea, as unstated as it is,
courts have rejected the Section 230 defense in a variety of very recent
cases when the defendant provider engages in conduct that directly violates
strict federal prohibitions.405
CONCLUSION
Immunity doctrine under Section 230 rests on an outdated view of how
most online intermediaries do business. Today, most providers do not
solely relay messages or make connections, uninterested in what their users
say or do. The largest and most popular applications today collect,
401
See, e.g., FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1193 (10th Cir. 2009) (describing the FTC
suit against online service for engaging in “unfair trade practices under” the Federal Trade Commission
Act); Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d 1157, 1175 (9th Cir.
2008) (describing a suit against an online operator for distributing third-party information in violation
of federal and state housing laws).
402
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).
403
See, e.g., Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1193 (describing the FTC suit against online service for
engaging in “unfair trade practices under” the Federal Trade Commission Act); Goddard, 640 F. Supp.
2d at 1195 (outlining an individual suit on behalf of herself and “a class of similarly situated
individuals”).
404
Consider civil rights cases in which courts have recognized parties acting as a private attorney
general in furtherance of the public interest. E.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400,
402 (1968).
405
See, e.g., Nunes v. Twitter, Inc., No. 14-CV-02843-VC, 2016 WL 3660526, at *1, *8 (N.D.
Cal. July 1, 2016) (holding Twitter is not immune from liability in a class action suit brought under the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act for unwanted tweets); Sherman v. Yahoo! Inc., 997 F. Supp. 2d
1129, 1137–38 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (finding the “good Samaritan” immunity inapplicable because Yahoo!
did not analyze content for offensive or harmful material); Perkins v. Linkedin Corp., 53 F. Supp. 3d
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exhaustively analyze, repackage, and then republish customer information.
And they engineer users’ online experiences to elicit as much information
as possible. There is nothing passive or indifferent in any of this. There is
certainly nothing in this that resembles “publishing.”
This is not an indictment of the activity or business model that the
largest and most popular intermediaries provide. But it does suggest that
courts ought to rethink the scope of the immunity under Section 230 in a
way that is adapted to the oversized influence that online applications and
marketplaces have on users’ online conduct today. It may be that it does
not matter what we call them— publishers or designers of user content—if
they are soliciting and curating and editing illicit material. But courts, this
Article proposes, should be far more attentive to the designs that determine
online content than the prevailing doctrine has allowed to this point. They
should shield providers from liability for third-party online conduct only to
the extent such providers truly operate as conduits or, as the statute
provides, they voluntarily act in good faith as Good Samaritans in the
interest of protecting the vulnerable among us.

